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ABSTRACT
The central question of this thesis explores what the thought of Canadian Jesuit
philosopher Bernard Lonergan may contribute to a Catholic perspective of environmental
ethics. In comparison with secular environmental movements, Roman Catholicism has
arrived relatively late on the scene to examine fonnally issues of specifically ecological
import from either a theological or academic stance. Catholic ecotheology is still in its
fonnation but offers much potential for effective collaboration among and between both
Catholics and non-Catholics. As it stands, the great variety of issues at stake in
environmental ethics calls for a multidisciplinary approach involving science,
technology, politics, economics, law, education, philosophy, and religion. Finding
common ground on which to discuss the issues and prioritize values proves difficult.
This thesis explores ways that common ground may be sought both within Catholicism
and in the broader secular sphere using Lonergan's three-fold notion of conversion
(intellectual, moral, and religious conversion), his notions of the human good and
collective responsibility, his method of self-appropriation, and his cognitional theory
which claims invariance in the structure and process of knowing. Because the call for
change, not just of social systems but also ofheans and minds, is a recurring theme in
any environmental ethics, L<mergan's notion of conversion will be crucial to this
exploration ofeommon ground.
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Cbapter One: Where Are We Going and How Did We Get Here?
An [ntroduction to tbe Situation
This chapter takes a multi-faceted approach to the issues of environmental ethics.
It contains a brief history of the emergence of an environmental awareness in Western
consciousness. It then introduces the current, work-in-progress state of Catholic
environmental ethics. To get a handle on how this situation came to be. we will also take
a look at a general notion of ethics rooted in Western Christianity and how the changing
scientific, political, and economic climate may influence public decision-making. An
introduction to the thought of philosopher Bernard Lonergan will set the stage for a
discussion of where Christian ethics may situate itself at the beginning of a new
millennium.
1. A Brier History of Environmental Awareness
While the "environmental crisis" and issues of ecology are at the fore of many
public discussions in contemporary Western society, such was not always the case.
Widespread environmental consciousness has only emerged in the last half of the
twentieth century; yet environmental degradation has been occurring around the world
for hundreds of years. While the pollution of the Industrial Revolution in England is an
ofl-cited example of the large-scale cost of human ''progress,'' damage done to the
environment goes back as far as the deforestation of ancient Rome and Greece. l 1963
marks perhaps the beginning of the environmental movement with the publication of
Rachel Carson's illuminating work, Silent Spring, a book which dealt with the use of
chemicals and pesticides in agriculture: International conferences on the environment
sprang up in the 19705, and heightened coverage of ecological disasters like Chemobyl
and the Exxon Valdez oil spill gave further impetus to the relevance of environmental
movements.) Today, although there is still much debate over specific policies and
procedures concerning the environment, there is a general public acceptance of the need
to keep ecological issues a priority for discussion.
The teon "ecology" initially did not hold the public significance it claims today,
having bccn coined by nineteenth-century botanists interested in communities of plants.
The notion has since grown to include all manner of life and the necessary
interdependence which exists to make the earth the dynamic system that it is. Ecology
emphasizes the interconnectedness of systems and literally means "house knowledge"
(Greek "eca-" meaning "bouse" and "-logy" meaning "Iogic" or "knowledge'l4 Given
the fact that environmental damage has occurred for centuries yet significant concern for
the problem goes back only a few decades, one could sunruse that we do not possess as
much "house knowledge" as we would like to think. or else do not use this knowledge
wisely. When it comes to matters oftbe environment, of sustainable development, of
conservation, and of healthy living, we are only just realizing the eXlent to which we
I Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," Scie'lce IS5 (March 10, t967): 1203-
1204.
l David SU>;Uki with Amanda McConnell, The So.cred Bala"ce: Rediscowm·"g our Place in Nature,
(Vancouver: Greystone Books, 1997),2; see also Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Miffiin,
1962).
lSuzuki.3
4 Jane Jacobs, The Nature ofF-conomie.f (Toronto; Vintage Canada, 2000), 10. S¢e also her notes to chapt~r
onc, IS2_IS3,forfunherexplanationoftheetym(>logyofthet~nn.
depend upon the self-sustaining order by which the natural environment operates. For
millennia the earth and life upon it existed and thrived in the absence of humans.
According to a wide rdrlge of environmental philosophies, non-human, natural processes
do not depend on humans to exist. Human beings, however, are inextricably tied through
their bodies and environment to these naturaJ processes. This bond is a necessary
condition of our common existence on this earth.s
While the environmental movement has had considerable impact on the public's
consciousness of environmental issues, there are many questions about its overall
effectiveness. Environmental issues often find their context in tenus of politics,
economics, technology, or law; in other words, there is more at stake in the matter than
just preserving, caring for, or respecting the natural world. There is a complex web of
relationships between buman social systems and the laws, cycles, and processes that
govern nature. Sometimes there are conflicts, particularly between the demands of
human systems and the sustainability of natural environments and resources. Often,
serious impediments face those searching for effective solutions. In the Western world
today, many environmental issues are complicated by politica! and economic factors.
One need only look to ncwspaper headlines highlighting the politics of the Kyoto
J Lonergan's writing contains several notions that can or have been already used in an environmental
contex!. The interconnectedncss ofhurnan beings and their environnu:nt isa theme which rnns through
much of what is written on ecology, from Gaia TIleory to Deep Eculogy. umergan's understanding of
interconnectedness is laid out in his notions of world order and emergent probability. For moll: on this see
chapter four of Insight: A Study ofHuman Understanding, by Bernard Lonergan, Co/leCied Work~ of
Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robe" M. Doran (Toronto; Univ~ilyof
Toronto Press, 1992) and Michael Shute's article, "Emergent Probability and the Ecofeminist Critique of
Hierarchy," in Lonergan and Feminism, cd. Cytllhia S.W. Crysdale (Toronto: University ofToronto Press,
t994). See also Anne Marie Dalton, A Theology for the Earth: Tire Contributions ofThornas Berry and
Bernard Lonergan, Religions and Beliefs Serie6, no. 10 (Ottawa: University ofOnawa Press, 1999)
Protocol, or to disputes between environmentalists and logging or mining corporations, to
realize environmental ethics is never about merely the environment.
2. Environmental Ethics and the Relevance of Religion
Environmental ethics inevitably raises questions about meaning. What does the
environment mean to us? Does it have any meaning apart from its usefulness to hwnan
beings? Are human beings to be considered special creations in nature's order? What
values should we let take precedence in our care for and use of the environment? Where
does life on earth fit in the bigger picture, and would the answer make any difference to
how we live? There are those in the environmental movement who believe that any quest
for meaning is frustrated if the questions of ultimate meaning are not also considered.
For example, proponents of the Deep Ecology movement profess to take a holistic view
of nature, where hwnan beings and nature are understood to hold equal intrinsic value
and there is no hierarchy of species. Rather than putting people at the centre of concern,
which Deep Ecologists see as an anthropocentrism that has dictated the state of affairs for
too long, they suggest taking a creation-centred orientation instead. However, Deep
Ecology, according to critic Grover Foley, "rejects distinctions in value, even in terms of
sentience.'06 So although Deep Ecology seeks to transfonn the hearts and minds of
humanity, beyond the quick-fixes oftechnologicaJ or political solutions for
environmental degradation, critics claim that among the movement's weaknesses is its
failure to define new values or address questions of ultimate meaning. Henryk
"Grover Foley. "Det'p Ecology and Subjectivity," The Ecologist 18, no 4/5 (1988): 110.
Skolimowski claims that without an orientation to ultimate meaning, we will be adrift in
deciding practical matters ofthe environment.7 He says: "A far reacbing ecological
conception of the world is incomplete wilhout somc fonn of eco-theology. As Rene
Dubois puts it: 'A truly ecological view of the world has religious overtones.'''s It is this
vein ofthought which this thesis will explore. This thesis will contend that any
environmental ethics should be open to asking questions of ultimate concern, a focus
traditionally reserved for religion, and that bc<:ause of their natural orientation 10 such
questions of ultimaIe meaning, religions have a relevance to environmental ethics.
Further, it will be suggested that there is more to the matter than simply "religious
overtones" as Dubois puts it. Religious diITerences are foundational differences,
differences which fundamentally affect how people understand and operate in the world,
and which lead to differences in policies and actions. If we let religious views extend
into environmental ethics, how are we to deal with such basic, foundational differences?
Irreligious differences are part oflbe problem, as scholars such as Lynn White, Jr. have
suggested, then addressing religious questions would seem to be an integral part of thc
solution. In particular, this thesis will examine some general aspects ofCathoJic
ccolheology with a focus on the potential contributions to be made by twentieth century
Canadian Catholic philosopher Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan did not write specifically on
the environment, but his thought otTers some fascinating possibilities for environmental
ethics. Lonergan's notion ofintc11ectual, moral, and religious conversion will be of
1 Henryk Sl<o[imowsli, "Eco·Philosophyand Deep Ecology," The Ecologist 18, no 4/5 (1988),124. For a
morc detailed representation of both sides of the debate, sec the entire issue 0f The Eeologisf 18,no4/5
(1988).
I Skolimowslri, "&a-Philosophy and Deep Ecology," 125
panicular interest, for its potential applicability to Catholic and non·Catholic
environmental contexts alike.
From a religious studies perspective, a large part of the conflict in deciding
matters ofenvironmcntal ethics is a Jack of effective dialogue. Dialogue must occur
between groups infonned by religious values and groups whose fields integrally affect
the environment such as the various sciences, economics, politics, and secular
environmental movements. All of these groups have their own notions about what
nature's ends are and what pan human beings play in both the betterment and degradation
ofthe environment. An have significant and unique contributions to make. The issue is
how to order or organize their contributions in a holistic manner: to take all their
concerns into consideration and to effectively deliberate on solulions to the problem. To
resolve their often conflicting notions they must not only be willing to discuss the issues
across disciplines but also be able to relate from some common ground. This thesis will
suggest that common ground may be established by considering the significance of
foundational, religious questions embodied in Lonergan's notion ofimel1ectual, moral,
and religious conversion.
3. Late on the Scene: Catholicism's Foray Into Environmental Ethics
When talk of"the environmental crisis" grew to the point ofheing a matter of
general public concern during the 1960s, it was the secular voices which commanded
attention and demanded action. Contemporary Western environmentalism existed, and
still exists, without substantial religious backing. It appears that only after the secular
world had identified and began to discuss the ecological crisis that Western organized
religions began to join the discussion and re-examine their theology. In the West, it was
Christian theology which undertook a noticeable self-scrutiny. Up to then, two
assumptions about Christianity held sway both inside and outside the Christian Church:
that Christianity was dedicated to the transcendent, the afterlife, the kingdom to come,
and that, when it did tum its focus to earthly maners, Christianity saw nature as
something to subdue and dominate, as commanded early in the book of Genesis (I :28).9
Given the changing times and society's new focus on the environment, a revision in
theology was clearly in order.
Thc Catholic Church is one example of a Christian religious institution whose
ambiguous relationship to the environment is still being sorted out. Until recent times
there was little significant contribution on environmental issues from a distinctly Catholic
perspective, either within the Catholic community or in the global arena. According to
Bernard J. Przewozny, the church's first statements acknowledging the environmental
crisis arc found in the 1965 document, Galldium et Spes, Vatican II's Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modem World. to The remarks are brief, alluding to the
environment through the need to regulate human activity so that it harmonizes with
God's witl and design. While the Vatican's first statements were roughly synchronal
with the birth oCthe environmental movement in the 196Os, there was little subsequent
reference to society's burgeoning ecological concerns until recently in the early 1990s
9"And God bless~d them, and God said to them, 'Be froitful and multiply, and fill the ~arth and subdu~ it;
and have dominion over the fish of the sca and over the birds of the air and ovcr cvcry living thing that
mo~'cs upon the canh. ,,, Gcnesis I:28, Revised Standard Edition.
Historically, environmental issues have not ranked high on the list of priorities
within the Catholic Church. In the face oftoday's ecological crises the Church's limited
official response has prompted a significant number of Catholic theologians to suggest
new, morc ecologically-centered theologies. These theologies have yet to settle and take
firm root in the institutional Church, but they do offer intriguing and potentially viablc
foundations for a Church looking to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. Catholic
ecotheology is thus a relatively new area of study and differences exist among Catholic
theologians. Michael H. Barnes, editor of a collection of essays by Christian writers on
thc ecological crisis, notes that:
...for most religious thinkers ecological consciousness is still in fonnation,
still defining itself in relation to specific issucs. Ecological aspects of
feminism, creation spirituality, sacramcntal presence, ethics of nature,
scripture and tradition, nature and face are still developing. It is the
growth of an ecology of the spiri!.1
Clearly there are a variety of perspectives, each with a measure of untapped potcntial,
from which to discuss the issues under the aegis ofCutholicism; some of these will be
taken up in the final chapter of this thesis. However, the religion must also contend with
and rclate to critics outside the institution.
From the perspective of secular environmentalists the religious viewpoint was,
and still is, often seen as being at the root of the problem. This attitude was exemplified
by Lynn White )r.'s famous essay, ''The Historical Roots of OUT Ecological Crisis,"
which blames Christianity for a large part of environmental irresponsibility and
'0 Bernard J. Pr.le\\onzny, ·The Catbolic Cburch and Ecological Concern," in Concern/or Creation: Voices
all/he Thet}!ogyo/Creation (Uppsala: Svenska Kyrkam; Forskningsrad, 1995), 54.
degradation. 12 White claims that Christianity is excessively anthropocentric; combining
anlhropocentrism with the biblical doctrine of dominion over the earth, this mindset has
infonned the West's mistreatment ofthc earth. l3 White criticizes Christianity for
following too closely and narrow-mindedly this biblical exhortation resulting in a faJse
superiority over nature, The response to White's article has been wide and varied,
making it a benchmark in the debate over religion's role in ecological matters. It has also
served as an impetus for scholars and theologians to dig deeper into ecological ethics,
Yet. while theology is in the process of catching up to contemporary ethical
issues, sorting through the ethical debate has not been made any easier on thc secular
front. North American secular society was born from, and is still residually rooted in,
Christian history. White notes that the Scientific and Industrial revolUlions, because of
their roots in Christian society, have also continued on in the presupposition of human
beings' mastery over the earth. 14 Although White's intent is to trace present scientific
and technological mindscts of domination and superiority back to Christian
anthropocentrism. it stands that regardless of its roots, anthropocentrism of one sort or
another still remains. One may sunnise from White's remarks that, if we gave up onc
fonn of anthropocenlrism, covered in the mantle of Christian religion, we traded it in for
II Michael H. Barnes, ~rntroduction: The Task of This Volume," in All Ecology a/the Spirit· RehgiolM
Reflectio1l and Environmemal Coll!iciQusness, The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society,
1990, vol.36 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 2
12 lynn White, Jr., 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis." At tbe same time, White urged
Christianiry to take role in reslOring the balarn:e and so did not eondone divorcing religion from either the
rroblemor tbe solution.
] Peter W. Bakken, Joan Gibb Engel, and J. ROllllld Engel, eds. Ecology, JU!I/ice, and Chris/ian Faith: A
Critical Guide /Q the Literature, Bibliographies and Indexes in Religious Studies, no. 36, (Westport, Corm'
Greenwood Press, 1995), 19. A similar interpretation is given by Peter Singer, Practical Ethia, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),265-266.
,. Bakken, Gibb Engel, and Engel, 48; see also White, 1206
another type of anthropocentrism, found in science and technology and secular notions of
progress. The Church's anlhropocentrism will be discussed in the fmal chapter. The
implications of secular anthropocentrism will be highlighted later in this chapter.
4. Some Issues In Contemporary' Decision-Making
Ethics must include both individual and communal contexts. Individuals make
personal decisions and communities arrive at consensuses, all in an effort to make sense
of the world and Jive according to some established order. Where docs religion fit in
today's public decision-making processes? It is a daunting task to discover and choose
what is really worthwhile. This is the question of ethics. But there is more to ethics than
right choices. An authentic conscience is not content with simply making the choice.
Moral living demands that we act in accordance with the choice made. It demands more
than a logical consistency of argument; at stake is the more difficult demand of
consistency between what we know and value and what we do. This pertains to both an
individual and a communal oontext, and to this perennial challenge contemporary thought
adds its own complications. Being moral, both personally and oommunally, is
complicated by the pluralism of contemponuy cultures and philosophies which would
stake a claim in shaping our moral horizon. The prevailing voices in Western modem
culture are post-modem, relativist, pluralist, liberal. and secularist. 15 Yet they arc onc in
IJ See Don Cupin, The Sea 0/Faith, 2nd cd. (London: SCM Press LId.• 1994) for an introduction to lhe
emergence of secularism and its subsequcnt effect nn Wcstern Christianity. One may also look to the
"maslers of suspicion," who emerged for late 19th and early 20th century lhought, such as Feuerbach,
Freud, Mant, and Nietzsche, who formed the modem foundation for criticism and skepticism nfreligion.
Sallie McFague gh'es a concise summary of postmodernity in Life Abundant: Rethinking Theolagy and
Ecallomyfor a Planer in Peril (Minneapolis: Forness Press, 2001), 26; see also Elizabeth A. Morelli,
10
their criticism of religious traditionalism. Their predominate and unifying characteristic
is the encouragement of individualism. Each person is left to discover his or her ovm
foundations,
Ethics poses the question to the decision-maker: "Where arc you headed and
how will you get there?" This may work well in the individual's private sphere but what
are we to do about common concerns? What are the choices? Do we settle issues by
public polls and referenda? Is it by some balance of self-interesIS? Was Thrasymachus,
Plato's adversary in the Republic, on the mark when he argued that, in the end, might
makes right? Ethics is more than individual action; that it is a frequent topic in the public
sphere is evidence enough of its relevance to collective activity. Furthermore, as ethicist
Peter Singer notes, ethics by its naturc is oriented to ultimate questions: from the biblical
writers to Kant., Hume, Bcntham, Rawls, Sartre, and Habermas, dcspitc thcir distinct
differences, all agree that ethics is a search for a normative point of view. It goes beyond
a personal sense of"I" and "you" to include issues of the common good, 16 Once we raise
the question of the common good we arc left to wonder on what basis we can accomplish
an effective consensus that will adequately direct efforts to solve common social
problems. Thc thought ofBemard Lonergan, to be introduced later in this chapter,
examines the interrelation between personal and public decision-making and claims that
there is a nonnative basis for making decisions, a claim which will serve as a foundation
for an examination of contemporary Catholic environmental ethics.
"Women's Intuition: A Loncrganian Analysis:' in Lonergan and Feminism, cd. Cynthia S.W. Crysdale
(Toronto: Univcnity of Toronto Press, 1994), 78-79.
l6Singer,II_12
11
S. How Do Science and Religion Relate?
Prior to the eighteenth century, the framework for deliberation in European and
North American society was ultimately in the context of organized religion. Even so, one
must keep in mind the Catholic-Protestant split since the Reformation, as well as the
increasing number of denominations since then wishing to be recognized within
Christianity. Thus, we would have to go back prior to the Refonnation to find an
institutionalized unity in ethics; the last five hundred years have seen the steady erosion
and dissolution of the cultural unity embodied spiritually in the Roman Catholic Church
and politically in the Holy Roman empire. Now the Holy Roman empire is reduced to
the postage stamp-size state, Vatican City. Where once religion was the major avenue for
exploring the most basic and Literally universal cosmological and existential questions, it
now competes with the developments of science and the emergence of the culture of
scientism for the attentions of a Western audience. Science involves data collection,
methodical investigation of measurable processes, experimentation, postulating of
underlying principles, and identi fication of regularity in nature. It seeks concrete
judgments of fact and generalizations regarding the systematic relation of one thing to
another. 11 However, while science has a lot to say about how 10 discover facts and make
proper explanations, it remains silent on what courses of action to take once the facts are
known and the situation is explained. Thus science has not been able (and, as will be
"frank Budenholzer, "Science and Religion: Seeking a Common Horizon," Z}gon 19. no 3 (September
1984): 350; atso Gerald L Schroeder, The SCience ofGod.: The Convergence ofScienrific and Biblical
Wisdom (New York: Broadway Books, t997) 5
12
argued, by its nature it simply is not able) to answer cenain deep and pervading questions
about our origins and our place in the universe, So while science has replaced religion as
a predominate authority on how the world works, it has not been able to provide the
complete common framework we require for sorting out and deliberdting about common
cthicalconcems.
Since the scienti fic revolution of the 17 t11 century, many pcople have perceived
science and religion \0 be at loggerheads. IS One need only look to the upheaval which
Galileo's refinement of the Copernican heliocentric model orthe solar system caused in
his geocentric and religiously-steeped society. This was a muddying of the boundary
between heaven and earth, to consider our globe as just another rock hurtling around the
sun. So too was Danvin's theory of evolution perceived as a challenge to Christian
interpretations of creation. Although both Galileo and DalWin and countless scientists
like them ncver intended their discoveries to so oppose traditional religious outlooks,
each scientific discovery would seem to drive a wedge betwccn what is tcOlled as a
rational inquiry about the world and a faith-filled understanding of creation. If, as
Butterfield argues, the scientific evolution "outshines everything since the rise of
Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Refonnalion to the rank of mere episodes,
mere internal displacements, within the system of Medieval Christendom,..19 then
If C.P. Snow was one of the influential contributors on this topic; see Charles Percy Snow. The Two
Cultures and the Scientific Rf!\'C/u/ion: The Rede Leclllre (Cambridge: University l'ress, t959). Snow. like
Lynn White, Jr., ""TOtc what has now become a henchman.: work. The Two Cultures pertains 10 Ihc gulf"of
mutual incomprehension" which Snow saw to exist between scientific and literary (meaning tbe
humanities) ways of thoughI. Snow, 4. Snow's essay spurred much debate, garnering its share ofdefeDders
and critics alike, but more importantly. drawing lasting attention to the ditTeTcItt kinds of academic thought
and raising queSlions as to whether they could relate from some COnuIlOQ ground.
19 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins ofthe Modern Science. f300·1800, 2nd ed, (New York: Free p~ss,
13
nevertheless the response to this genuine intellectual development on the part of
institutionalized Western religions like Roman Catholicism was at best cool. The debate
between competing religious and scientific cosmologies continues in some fonn even
today, as for example, in the disputes over the teaching of evolution and creation science
in public schools in the United States.20
Although mainstream Christian churches in the last century acknowledged the
legitimacy of the scientific revolution, the broadening scope of science treads into fields
that organized religion lraditionally considered its own jurisdiction, such as issues
involving procreation, detennining what it is to be human, and explaining the nature of
death. Further, it seems the environmental question emerged as a secular development
first, a product of scientific concern and investigation. So although environmental issues
arc also linked to questions of human existence and meaning, environmental ethics as we
know it does nOI have an explicitly religious hislory, With scientific minds now
pondering the varied mysteries of the universe, religion is left to reconsider its territory
and relevance, especially towards issues it may have neglected in the past. Scholars have
nOled Christianity's rather "breathless" arrival, lale on the scene of environmental ethics
and needing to catch up to contemporary secular environmental movements. 21 Both
science and religion address questions relevant 10 understanding our own lives and the
1966),7
>D See Goorge Marsden, Fundamentalism and Am"n'can Culture: The Shaping ofTwentieth Century
EWlngelicalism /870_J925 (NewYorlc Oxford Uni\'crsily Press, 1980) aod U"derstandmg
Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Ecrdmans, 1991).
11 Sean McTh:magh, The Greening ofthe Church (Scoresby, Vic.: The Canterbury Press, 1990) 192, quoted
in Denis Edwards, "The Integrity of Creation: Catholic Social Teaching for an Ecological Age," Pacifica 5
(1992): 190. Lonergan uses a similar el<pression in/n:;ight, pertaining to maners ofrtason and faith in
Catholicism, 755
14
world in which we live. However, in the contexts of social policy and the public good,
religion, whose belief systems "bound together" communities of previous ages, cannol be
said to have a monopoly on fulfilling this function in the pluralism oftbe contemporary
Western world.
Don Cupitt notes that modem Christianity is making a slUft in its prime focus
towards social ethics, to defend individual human rights and to protect human dignity
from potentially dehumanizing forces in the state and in technology.12 Yet if Christianity
tries 10 put more emphasis on making social ethics and the common good its business, it
ventures forth into uncertain and turbulent waters. Ethicist Margaret Somerville claims
that a society which commits itself to secularism and individualism has lost its
commitment to the common good: an emphasis on tolerance, plurality, and individual
freedom loses almost any sense of community good.B Somerville is concerned that this
is the case in North America. This is particularly a problem for environmental ethics
where the tension between individual freedom and perceived common good is
particularly sharp. This tension is clearly manifest in present disputes across the country
around over-fishing, logging old-groWlh forests, strip mining, and toxic waste disposal.
In such matters there is often a polarity between private corporations or occupational
unions and groups claiming 10 represent an environmental common good. One must
question the efficacy of systems which keep discussion of the common good to a
minimum. If, for example, liberalism's primary approach to resolving social questions is
llCupitl,1O
D Margaret Somerville, The Elhical Canary: Science. Society and the Hilman Spirit (Toronto: Penguin
Books, 2000).
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an attitude oftolcrance, its weakness would seem to lie in the inadequacy of such an
approach; guidance merely through tolerance fails to consider the need of a higher order
beyond the balancing of individual interests. Religious views see asking questions of
ultimate meaning to be essential to sorting out issues of individual and common good.
Given the rapid pace of technological development, the globalizing economy, and
the advance of pluralism, it is no surprise there has been a surge ofpublie interest in
ethical questions, especially on medical and environmental issues such as transgenic
organ implantations, biomedical engineering, waste management, and the energy crisis
All these issues have wide- and long-ranging implications. Human beings as a species
can make a significant impact on the environment and on each other at a much faster rate
and with a much greater force than ever before. It is often easier to perfect a skill, hone a
technology, or make a scientific breakthrough, than it is to reflect on the consequences.
We can do many things, but should we do all of them? To be effective, ethics must keep
pace with issues as they arise. For example, the growth of contemporary secularism and
individualism raise questions about how 10 dctenninc and organize around a conunon
good. and if we should at all. In matters of the common good, do religious values offer a
contribution? If so, is this contribution helpful? Are there any perspectives which could
lead to specific development in religion-based (in this context, specifically Roman
Catholic) environmental ethics?
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6. Lonergan and tbe Crisis of Culture
The difficulties in establishing cffective dialogue between secular and religious
approaches to ethics are part of a larger situation which Lonergan calls a "crisis in
culture." A Catholic priest and philosopher from Quebec, Bernard IF. Lonergan (1904-
1984) is perhaps best known for his theory of knowing and his method in theology called
functional specialization. However, Lonergan's interests spanned from mathematics to
the philosophy of history lO the human scienccs of sociology, politics, and cconomics.24
As a contemporary thinker he was especially concerned with the dynamics of progress
and decline in human society and panicularly with the "crisis of culture" which he saw to
hinder progress and exacerbate decline. To this we will tum shortly. He was also
concerned with meeting the modem world's challenges to Catholic thought and practice.
While conservative in temperament, Lonergan was open to genuine secular
developments, especially in the empirical sciences and historical scholarship. In my
view, Lonergan provides a particularly rich source for addressing the questions of this
thesis.
Before proceeding further we must establish some orthe foundations from which
Lonergan's thought operates. Similar to psychologist Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of
needs,2~ Loncrgan works from the assumption that there is a hierarchy ofvalues?6 The
l< Grant D. Miller Francisco, "Lonergan, Bernard," Dictionary o/Modern Western Theology II. /998-1999;
http://www.bu.edulwwildnunlWeirdWiJdWeb/co...mwtldictionary/mwt_themes_840_tonergan.hlm;
accessed August 20, 2001.
II Maslow's hierarchy stales lhat the physical, psyctlologicat, and emotional needs of human beings mUSI
be mel in a certain order; the pyramid structure of his hierarchical model demonslr.Ites that the most basic
needs are foundal the boflom of the pyramid and thus serve as a foundation upon which all olherneedsare
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most basic values are vilal values which include things like health, vitality, strength and
physical grace of the individual. These arc followed by social values, or the good of
order. Social values detennine how a community is organized in terms of economies,
governance, technology, and law, among other systems. They ensure that basic needs are
met. Basic needs like securing food and shelter, maintaining healtll, and making a living
may be met in a variety of ways through different social organizations as the two recent,
large-scale, and contrasting examples of capitalism and communism exemplify. Each is a
system of meeting basic needs but the values embodied in each differ greatly. After
social values follow cultural values, which deal in meaning. The meaning common to a
community is expressed through and propagated by things like education, art, literature,
music, and criticism. Personal values remind us that it is individuals who make up a
community and each person has the capacity to make choices which impact upon the
community; these values describe the morals and concrete decisions made by each
private citizen. Ultimate or religious values are the core meanings which orient human
living, guide how our character is developed, and evaluate the final worth of our actions.
One need not be explicitly religious to be guided by ultimate values or considcr questions
of ultimate meaning; to be oricnted to mystCTy and to possess the potential to ask
existential questions are things to which Lonergan insists all humanity is predisposed.
Lonergan believed this to be the structure of value, ordered into a hierarchy. The
hierarchy demonstrates reciprocal relationships between values: the higher values as
met. See Frank G. Goble, The Third Force' The Psychology ofAbraham Maslow, y,ith a forward by
Abraham Maslow (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970).
26 Bernard Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology (Toronto: Uoiversity ofToronto Press, 1971),31-32.
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found in the cultural, personal, and ultimate spheres cannot be addressed or explored until
the lower values are first provided for or satisfied (e.g. one cannot adequately ponder
life's mysteries if one is starving); in a top-down direction the higher values orient how
we meet the lower ones (e.g. ifone generally values equality of all persons then one will
support making health care services available to all). in other words, fulfilling the
"lower" values, those basic to physical survival, makes it possible to contemplate and
expand upon the "higher" values, those which allow hearts, minds, and spirits to flourish.
At the same time, the higher values orient the lower values. Furthennore, if people
become preoccupied with one level of value over another, the imbalance can throw the
hierarchy off; for example, a society too engrossed in the workings of its economy may
nol experience a flourishing of culture, while another society preoccupied with the
minutiae of its theology may fail to see how the basic needs of its members may best be
met. Lonergan sees a dialectical relationship existing between the higher values which
orient and the lower values whieh are conditioning.
It is in this context oflcvels ofvalue that Lonergan's notion of"crisis of culture"
may be discussed. Our commitment to what we value and how we prioritize those values
will orien! our action, which is the stuff of ethics. Lonergan claims that the hierarchy of
values as he lays it out is the normative state of human value. lfwe experience a erisis at
any level of value, or especially if we operate within a disordered hierarchy, as Lonergan
claims is the present case, our ethics will suffer, too.
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Many thinkers, past and present, have meditated on the loss of common ground or
common, ultimate, frames of reference that seems to be occurring in the West. 27 James
Marsh writes:
Heidegger complains that the twentieth century has witnessed a loss ofthe
sense ofbeing. The loss ora sense of being is, to a significant extent, a
politicaJ problem. Subjectivity, being, and God are covered over by a
social system that reduces human beings to objects, equates reality with
the technocratic, commodified surface and turns God into an unverifiable
myth.2s
If this is the case, without a common ground and an adequate sense of purpose, how will
we coUectively make ethical decisions that affect us all? Although Marsh decides to
address the problem from a political perspective, with some thought-provoking results/9
Lonergan's view takes the root of this dilemma beyond the political. He traces the loss of
a sense of being through all aspects of the social structure: politics, economics, law,
technology, the family organization, churches and sects. Although he terms it a crisis of
culture, it seems to be very much socially concerned. On this count, Lonergan offers this
distinction between the social and the cultural: ;'The social is conceived ofas a way of
life, a way in which men live together in some orderly and therefore predictable
17 See Somerville, The EthiCilI Canary; also E. A. Morelli, "Women's Intuition: A Lonerganian Analysis,"
7g·79
U James Marsh, "Pruis and Ultimate Reatity: Intellectual, Moral and Religious Conversion as Radical
Political Conversion," in Ultimat" Reality and Meaning: Interdisciplinary Srudies i1l the Philosophy of
Understanding 13, no. 3 (September t990): 238.
1'l Marsh's article examines rhe socio-political implicationsofLoncrgan's notionorconversion. His
assertion that capitalism is inherentlyiocompatib1e witb Lonergan'snotio[\ofconversion is particularly
compelling. The implications may be explored more fully in a discussion offree markel environmentalism;
see Terry L. Anderson and Donald Leal, Free Mar~et Environmenlalism, rev. ed. (New York: Palgrave
Press, :Z001). Anderson and Leal are proponents ofrree market environmentalism, serving 10 drastically
contrasl with Marsh's interpretation of the market aDd Lonergan's notioD ofconversion. Free market
environmentalism encourages entrepreneurs to take control of the environment, turning a profit while
supposedly prote<:{ing and regulaling nalure's rcsolITCes. 'The authors' argwnents are compelling, but
critics such as Herman Daly argue thaI cnvironmental ethics must encompass much ITKlre lhan simply
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fashion."JO The social sphere is essentially the mechanism for meeting needs. Culture, in
tenns of his scale of values, is built upon social organization:
For men not only do things. They wish to understand their own doing.
They wish to discover and to express the appropriateness, the meaning, the
significance, the vaJue, and the use of their way oflife as a whole and in
its paris. Such discovery and expression constitute the cultural and, quite
evidently, culture stands to social order as soul to body, for any element of
social order will be rejected the moment it is widely judged inappropriate,
meaningless, irrelevant, useless, just not worthwhile. 3!
In other words, the social revolves arOWld organizing ourselves to get things done. Ethics
concerns itselfwith getting things done properly and thus serves as a bridge between the
social sphere and the higher values embodied in culture and religion. This is a case in
point of how lower values condition higher ones and how higher values orient lower
ones. Social systems aJlow the possibility of higher culture to emerge. The culture that
fonns oricnts the particular ways thai those social systems operate. Yet today, in
Lonergan's estimation, the prevailing Western attitude denies the relevance of religious
values to modem living in the public sphere. 32 In an environmental context, the politics,
economics, technologies, laws, and other social systems that influence the environment
no longer seem to be oriented by the full contingent of higher cultural, personal and
religious/ultimate values on Lonergan's hierarchy of values. Neglecting to account for
any of these higher values, in this case, religious values in the context of environmental
managing the environmen1. See Hcnnan Daly. "Free Markcl Environmentalism Turning a Good Servant
in!oa Bad Master." Critical Revicw6, 00 2-3 (1993): 171-183.
)OJ Bernard Lonergan, '~rhe Absence of God in Modem Culture," in A Second Co/lectiO/I, ed. William F.J
Ryan lind Bernard J. T}Teli (Philadelphia: The Wesuninstcr Press, 1974), 102.
"Ibid
12 1bid.,101.116.
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ethics, means that an essential part of the equation is missing. In order for lhe hierarchy
of values to be nonnative, which Lonergan claims it is, all parts must be included.
In speaking oflhe crisis of culture (although one must keep in mind that the
"crisis" affects more than just cul!ure), Lonergan refers to changes in meaning.Jl The
whole of human life is steeped in meaning. Religious, personal, cultural, social, and vital
values are shaped by our systems of meaning; what defines a community is lha! it shares
a sense of meaning:
Community is a matter of a common field of experience, a common mode
of understanding, a conunon measure of judgment, and a common
consent. Such community is the possibility, the source, the ground, of
common meaning; and it is this common meaning that is the fonn and act
that finds expression in family and polity, in the legal and economic
system, in customary morals and educational arrangements, in language
and literature, art and religion, philosophy, science, and the writing of
history.34
Yel with the diversity of philosophies and associated lifestyles in our modem culture, the
common reservoir of meaning risks being fmgmented or being lost altogether. Although
we may be conlenl to identify ourselves with smaller groups in tenos of things like
ethnicity, religion, and geography, il remains that we are members of the public sphere,
especially in terms of politics, economics, health care, education, and the environment.
We therefore cannot abandon the requirements for determining public policies. Public
decision-making is thus still vital and demands consensus on some form of common
ground of meaning and value. Lonergan notes further that ifmcaning ilse1fis an
important part of human living, the rctlcction on meaning and the control of meaning are
), Bernard Lonergan, "Dimemions of Meaning," in Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergllll,
Volume 4, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University ofToronlo Press, 19S8) 235
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still more important, "[flor if social and cultural changes are, at root, changes in the
meaning that are grasped and accepted, changes in the control of meaning mark off the
great epochs in human history. ,,)5 It is this control of meaning to which we now tum.
According to Lonergan, the development of humanity has passed through several
stages of consciousness and degrees of self.rcflection.3~ These will be examined in more
detail below. The first stagc was the development of practical common sensc. The
second stage was the development of theory. This flows into our present state, a rather
more muddied, intennediate state of self-awareness accompanied by uncertainty and
what some might call existential angst. Lonergan says there is a third stage yet to be
reached but which offers great potcntial for a differentiated consciousness and authentic
living. What marks off one era or stage from anothcr is change in the control of
meaning.37 Meaning is controlled by such things as alphabets, grammar, philosophy,
logic, narrative, lexicon, and symbols. When these change, so too does the dcgree of
differentiation of the collective consciousness of a culture. The primitive consciousness
of the first human communities focused on collections of common sense knowledge, with
little indication of philosophical reflcction. Religion bound human beings to the divine
and to the earth. With the advance of common sense innovation, there were great
developments in technical, economic, domestic, and political structures, but history and
l< Ibid.• 234.
lllbid.,235.
:l6 Bernard Lonergan, "Natural RighI and Historical Mindedness," in A Third CQlluliQn: Papers by
Bernard J.F. umergan. SJ., ed Frederick E. Crowc (New York: Paulist Press, 1985). Lonergan cites three
stages, or plate:aus, of history. Sec also Michael Shute, The Origins ofLanergan '$ NOlion of/he Dialectic
ofHistory: A Study ofLonergan's Early Writings on History (Lanham, NY: University Press ofAmerica,
1993)
l' Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning'" 235.
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human nature were understood to be guided by fate, destiny, or divine providence.38 The
beginning of the next epoch arose into what is called a classical consciousness,
exemplified by Greek thought with its focus on theory, self-knowledge, and unchanging
universals like Plato's eternal good. The workings of the mind fascinated Greek
philosophers, who developed methods of systematic thinking first in philosophy and later
in science. The controls on meaning in the classical context shifted away from the
primitive immediacy of common scnse to cternal ideals.39 Religion still played an
important part as mediator between humanity and the divine, but more emphasis was
placed on differcnliating theory from practice in all areas of Hfe. With the emergence of
the scientific method, the Enlightenment, and increasing skepticism about the validity
and relevance of religion, Western humanity arrived at what Lonergan calls the present-
day "troubled eonsciousncss.'o4O The deductive techniques and cternal truths of classical
consciousness began to give way to that which was empirical, concrete, and historical.41
This new awareness (borrowing an image from the physicist Eddington) on the one hand
acknowledges the reality ofa table made of solid, heavy, brown wood yet on the other
hand also can recognize the table as mostly empty space and atoms.42 Thus the
contributions of science have done much to explain the world but also to present us with
a more complex understanding, a dual reality which leaves us trying to reconcile
seemingly contradictory notions. These changes in meaning (for example, something as
1I Lonergan, "Natunl Right and Historical Mindedncss," 178; and Shute, Dialectic ofHistory, 2.
'9 Shute, Dialecn·cofHislOry, 2-3.
.0 Lonergan, Merhod in Theology, 84
'I Shute, Dialecticojlfistory, 5.
"Lonergan,Me/h.od!n Theology, 84.
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deceptively simple as "What is a table?'') prompted Lonergan to characterize his, and
now our, modem times in terms ofrapid change and a preoccupation with the self:
...modem culture transforms man's control over nature and in consequence
involves a reordering of society. The new scene is onc of technology,
automation, built-in obsolescence, a population explosion, increasing
longevity, urbanism, mobility, detached and functional relations between
persons, universal, prolonged, and continuing education, increasing leisure
and travel, instantaneous information, and perpetually available
entertainment. In this evcr changing scene God, when not totally absent,
appears an intruder. To mention him, if not meaningless, seems to be
irrelevant.43
It is this irrelevance of the divine, transcendent mystery, embodied for Lonergan
in the Christian God but applicable to any human sense of ultimate meaning,
which troubled him. Despite advances and achievements attributed to modern
thinking, Lonergan was concerned that his era may have lost sight of the pinnacle
in the hierarchy of values, that which is provided by an orientation to ultimate
meaning. Furthennore, he did not believe that questions of ultimate meaning
could be met completely at a personal, individual level but rather must be shared
with a community: the quest for ultimate meaning must be supported by a
community's willingness and openness to explore those questions and to live
collectively by the answers. Just as contemporary Western society generally lives
by a confidence in and reliance on collaborative scientific investigation, in matters
of everything from nutrition to medicine to engineering to communications, so
Lonergan believed there was a place for religious values in guiding how we
organize ourselves around ultimate, and thus common, goods.
"'Lonergan, "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," 114.
25
In this millennia-long progression of consciousness from primitive to classical to
modem (or "troubled''), Lonergan says there is a further, third stage yet to be grasped
collectively, that of an adequately differentiated consciousness. It involves a shift to
interiority, a self-awareness which might resolve issues of "troubled consciousness."
This is a self-awareness which acknowledges the nomative and transcendental aspects of
human knowing (to be explored in the next chapter), which is able 10 shift appropriately
between mental processes and distinct contexts of meaning, which is attentive, intelligem,
reasonable, and responsible. In other words, Lonergan believes we have not yct reached
our full potcntial as beings who know and choose. In all stages of humanity's
development there is a pemlanent tension characterized by the push and pull between
historicity and human nature. Each stage of consciousness which Lonergan identified
found its own way of dealing with Ihis tension. Upheavals in thought and changes in
collective meaning marked ofT the epochs. Lonergan parallels this collective shift of
consciousness with the individual shift in consciousness rooted in his cognitional thcory.
As individuals are meant to develop higher levels of consciousness through self-
appropriation, so too does he believe we should aim for a higher state ofoollective
consciousness. The future is always uncertain, bUI knowing where we have come from
and how we arrived will help guide us more intelligently and responsibly to where we
should go and how we should get there.
If collective meaning defines a culture and, if the shifts in the control of that
meaning define epochs of human history, it is the notion of collective responsibility,
which will be taken up in the last chapter of this thesis, that Lonergan intends to develop
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when addressing the crisis of culture. As Lonergan argued, the crisis of culture we find
ourselves in, and the potential for religion to regain a social role, are rooted in the push-
and-pull relationship of the two components which make up concrete human reality: "on
the one hand, a constant, human nature; on the other hand, a variable, human history.
Nature is given man at birth. Historicity is what man makes ofman.".w It is the present-
day secular philosophies of history which strike Lonergan as inadequate for handling this
crisis of culture and moving us beyond a fragmented, troubled consciousness into a fuller
and more authentic state of being. He saw this troubled consciousness demonstrated in a
wide-spread liberalism of North America: a view which extols progress as a virtue, but in
tenns of a seemingly unending progress which embraces rapid technological
development, booming expansion of capitalist economies, and the elevation of the rights
and interests of the individual over the common goO(I.~5 Scholars have noted that
similarly, modem communist and socialist philosophies, in extolling their own versions
of virtue, have had their pitfalls. In sum, as Shute notes: "Loose from its spiritual
moorings western culture finds itselflacking in a sense of direction olher than that
provided by the competing interests of the powerful.',4(i This suggests that there is an
imbalance in the hierarchy of values, that being the preoccupation with and domination of
social (i.e. political and economic) power to the neglect of higher cultural and ultimate
values. Such an imbalance is seen to further skcw ethical priorities.
.. Lonergan, "NatUJlll Right and Historical Mindedness," 170. In this discussion, Lonergan fuses ancient
Greek thought (natural right) with the 19th century idea of historicity. Natural right was the Greek answer
to what made humans different from animals, lhat being a '"permanent and binding force" such lhat
"[u]Bdcrneath the manifold ofhllman lifestyles, there exisled a component or factor that possessed the
clairns to Ilniversality and permanence of nature itself" 172.
'l ShIIte, DialectkQiHi.story, 5.6.
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Just as it did not seem possible to build a foundation of proper action solely upon
economic or political principles, neither was Lonergan convinced that a culture steeped in
the philosophies of science could be sufficient for exploring issues of ultimate meaning
that would help guide discussion in ethics. Lonergan describes the scientific method: "it
begins from data, it discerns intelligiblc unities and relationships within data, and it is
subject to the check of verification, to the correction and revision to be effected by
confrontation with further relevant data.''''7 Having said this, Lonergan cautions:
Now such procedures cannot lead one beyond this world. The divine is
not a datum to be observed by sense or to be uncovered by introspection.
Nor will any intelligible unity or relationship verifiable within such data
lead us totally beyond such data to God. Precisely because modem
science is specialized knowledge of man and of nature, it cannot include
knowledge ofOod. God is neither man nor naturc.48
Again, God here is the Christian embodiment of transcendent mystery. Lonergan's
concerns are twofold: that either we are using the wrong tools to probe into this mystery
(e.g. to think that science can answer all the questions we have and advise us on proper
courses of action) or that we are no longer attuned to the mystery at all (e.g. to be too
caught up in the mechanics of making a living, of production and consumption).
Thus, Lonergan notes what he calls the absencc of God in modem culture. This
applies increasingly to modem religion as much as anything else: rather than offering
counter-cultural alternatives and transcending the clamour of cultural confusion, the more
.. Ibid., 7.
<1 Lonergan, "The Absence orGod in Modem CuJrure," 107.
"Ibid.
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religion aligns ilselfwith societal forces which tend to ncglect the questions of ultimate
meaning, the more it risks making itself irrelevant.49
7. Christian Thought in a CODtemporary World
Christian thought has struggled to meet the challenges of broadening secularism,
but Lonergan argues that it stumbles in its shoncomings insofar as it operates from the
precepts of classical consciousness;so thus, Catholicism has not escaped unscathed from
the issue of the troubled consciousness. Concerned with what he considered antiquated
notions and a questionable contemporary relevance of the religion, Lonergan assened the
need for the Church to advance without sacrificing its core beliefs: only by bringing the
Christian lradition up to speed with contemporary consciousness without itself falling
victim 10 fleeting trends could there be hope of countering the cultural crisis from a
Christian stance.
For theology to mediate effectively between religion and culture it must
understand thc past, move with the times, and have a vision for the future. As a priest
and philosopher critical of the weaknesses of his own discipline of theology, Lonergan
was distressed at theology's retreat from the pressing ethical issues which modem
science, philosophy, and law have since co-opted. Faced with what appeared to be the
absence of God in modem culture, umcrgan hoped that theology would remain relevant
•• See McFague 35. McFague is a proponent of religion offering countcrcultural altcrnatives. Sbenotes,
ho\W:ver, that it is ironic that the very forces such as politics, ~'Conomics, and science which displaced the
social influence of religion and gave birth to secu13rismnow influence how religionconducts itself; she
suggests that secularism subtly dictates religion, in manners such as extolling the vinues of capitalism. At
the samc time, the other side of the coin is the potential stagnation ofreligion ifitdoes 001 keep pace with
the times, which wili be addressed latcr in thischaptcr.
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and fill that void: "if increasing specialization prevents modem science from speaking of
God, one would expect it to enable modem theology to speak of God all thc more fully
and effectively. However, while I hope and labor that Ihis will be so, I have to grant that
it is not yet achieved. Contemporary theology and especially contemporary Catholic
theology are in a feverish fenncnt."s' He claimed that this stagnation is due not just to
old theology being obsolete or to there being only a scattering of new theology from
which to reap; what is missing is an entirely new way to integrate the multiplicity of
perspectives, the changing times, and the new dilemmas posed by scientific and
technological "progress".Sl The theology leading up to Lonergan's day concerned itself
mostly with dogma and doctrine, to the detriment of those looking for religion's guidance
in important everyday matters. Lonergan believed that theology should embrace new
developments in human affairs rather than retreat from thcm.53 Theology, in Lonergan's
own words, "mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion
in that matrix.'.s4 For theology 10 tum its back on culture and to no longer be a mediator
between humans and the ultimate questions they ask means that theology would renounce
any claim (0 ethics, leaving the door open to ethics based solely on things like political or
economic principles, values which arc not oriented to questions of ultimate meaning. He
further claimed that contemporary Catholic theology can no longer afford to be narrow-
"'Shute, DialrxticojHistory, 7
~I Lonergan, "The Absence of God in Modem Culture," 108
.. "Catholic thwlogyal present is at a crilicaljuncture. Ifl may expr~s a personal view.l should say that
Ihe contemporary lask of assimilating the fruilS bolh of religious studies and oftlu:: new philosophies, of
handling the problems ofdemythologization and oflhe possibility ofobjectivc religious Slalement, imposes
on theology lhetask ofrccasting its oolion oftbrological method in the mostthoroughgoingandprofound
fashion." Lonergan, ""The Absence of God in Modem Culture," Ill.
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minded and exclusive; it must "reach not only Christians but also non-Christians and
atheists. It has to learn to draw not only on the modern philosophies but also on the
relatively new sciences of religion, psychology, sociology, and to the new techniques of
the communication arts."S5 The trick is to balance modern developments with staying
true to Christian principles; to walk in step but not become misled by false promises.
This is why Lonergan adopted the task of developing a scientific, empirical
understanding of the historical process which accounted for both human nature and
historicity and at the same time affinned the central truths of Christianity.S6 He also
sought to fannulate his cognitional theory into a generalized empirical method which
could be applied across disciplines. Far from being opposed to the principles and
methods of science, Lonergan looked for ways scientific and religious thought could
complement each other and mutually contribute to contemporary issues. He was opposed
to an overuse or misappropriation of scientific mindsets which preswned to answer
questions of ultimate meaning while overlooking religious values. He was similarly
opposed to narrow religious viewpoints which would not advert to scientific authority
where appropriate. Ifcontemporary Christianity is still struggling to resolve its classical
bent, it must do so with open eyes:
Classical culture cannot be jettisoned without being replaced; and what
replaces it cannot but run counter to classical expectations. There is
bound to be fonned a solid right that is detennined to live in a world that
no longer exists. There is bound to be fonned a scattered left, captivated
lJ Laurenll.educ, "Theology and Ecology: A Lonerganian Approach," Religious Studies and Theology 13-
14, no. 1 (April 1995):10.
.. Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology, Jli
5. Lonergan. "Theology in its New ConteJll," in C<mw7sion: Perspec/iws on Personal ami Social
Transformation. cd. Walter E. Conn (New York: Alba House, 1918) 10.
";Shute, Dialecticojlfislory, 7
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by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that
new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big
enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to
work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse
half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to
wait. S7
Thus, Lonergan strove to sort out the relationship between the mutual
contributions of science and religion, and to balance the modem with the
traditional.
Where, then, do religious values fit in tOOay's society? According to Lonergan,
religious or ultimate concerns crown what he sees to be the nonnative, hierarchical
structure of values. Yet by the same token, ifreligion is still very much a part ofpcoplc's
private lives, it nevertheless seems that secular replacements for religion guide most
ethical discussion in the public sphere. Neglecting either to ask questions of ultimate
concern or else removing them from a religious context is really a dilution orthe proper
order of values and thus an inauthentic response to the problems of the world. What
common framework is there for a dialogue between secular ethics and religious ethics?
Those like Lonergan believe there is still a place for religious values in thc contemporary
debate concerning environmental ethics, biocthics, international development, or other
issues of social policy. In tenns of environmental ethics, although Christianity by turns
has been blamed by scholars like Lynn White, Jr. for a significant contribution to
environmental degradation and for arriving late on the scene in expressing its concern,
there arc those who believe the Church has the resources to offer potential solutions.
Discovering what religion has to offer in this respcct may highlight what secular ethics
11 Lonergan, "Dimensions or Meaning," 245
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has in common with religious ethics. Secular environmental ethics are already well
established, with the environmental movement owing a large part to the advances in
scientific investigation and empiricaJ method. Lonergan will suggest that a generalized
empirical method also is at work in maners of sclf·awarencss and the asking of questions
of ultimate meaning. $0 while environmental concern seems to be the domain first of
science, the relevance of religion partially lies in the roots it shares with science, as
Lonergan explains in his account of cognitional theory. Its relevance also lies in its
orientation to questions of ultimate meaning, which some scholars suggest is essential to
adequately addressing issues of environmental concern. ss The so-called "troubled
consciousness" which Lonergan sees to exist in the contemporary Western world seems
to be caused by a disordered hierarchy of values and a growing uncertainty about what, if
anything, of the human condition is nonnative or universal. Without noons to anchor our
inquiries, how can we really know anything? Lonergan will assert that norots do indeed
exist. How can we locate and communicate the relevant social role ofrc1igion? In this
thesis I will argue that Lonergan's work in religious ethics-his cognitional theory,
understanding of the human good, and notion of intellectual, moral, and religious
conversion-offers a relevant and viable structure for analyzing ethical issues and for
setting up a common framework for dialogue between secular and religious ethical
viewpoints, pertaining specifically to environmenlal ethics.
As mentioned in the introduction, ecology literally means "house knowledge."
For Lonergan. an understanding of the structure of knowledge is the key. Lonergan's
"Sccnotes6and7.
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work on cognitional theory will serve as a springboard into the oftcn choppy waters of
ethics. On knowing, Lonergan had this to say:
To discover the self-transcendence proper to tbe human process of coming to know
is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the
mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what
one is doing when one is knowing.59
It is this breaking of habits which will be introduced and explored in the following
chapters as Lonergan's notion of conversion. It is his notion of knowing which will
introduce the concept of self-transcendence and its relevance to ethical discussion. And it
is acquiring mastery in one's own house through conversion and self-transcendence
which will guide the discussion of religion's role in ecological ethics.
'"Lonergan,Merhrxfin TiJeology,239-240.
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Chapter Two: The FUBdamentals of Lonergan's Account of Ethics
This chapter offers a more in-depth look at the foundation of Lonergan's thought,
namely his theory of cognition. Once we have introduced the theory, method, and
relevance behind Lonergan's work, we will proceed towards a discussion of his notion of
conversion. Lonergan identified three types of conversion: intellectual, moral, and
religious. This chapter will introduce and examine the notions of intellectual and moral
conversion in order to set up a discussion of religious conversion in the following
chapter.
I. Ethics and Lonergan's Cognitional Theory
Ethics is about proper action. The word "proper" indicates that there exists a
standard by which we can judge our actions. This nonnative notion of ethics, however, is
put to the test in pluralist cultures. Western, and particularly North American, culture is
one such example ora society which struggles with plurality in ethical issues. In light of
this, how wil1 we manage issues of the common good wilh respect to environmental
ethics? [fwe share the same political and economic systems, are the values embodied in
these social systems adequate for detennining our official policies and personal attitudes
towards the environment? Is there something more that needs to be considered? Do we
have anything else in common by which to make decisions for the public good?
Ethically speaking, how will we know when we are speaking the same language, using
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the same meanings, making the same assumptions, and not only valuing the same things
but valuing the proper things, or if we ought to abide by the same things at all?
Bemard Lonergan was among those detennined to stake claim to the possibility of
conunon ground in the study of ethics. One of his lifelong preoccupations was exploring
the relationship between human nature and history. In his view, on the one hand, human
nature is a constant. On the other hand, history is a variable. While all cultures have a
history, each has their own. A collection of cultures such as comprises North American
society is united by certain shared values, such as those embodied in democratic politics
and capitalistic economics, yet is not sufficiently unified for public decision-making to
come easy. With this in mind, Lonergan undertook a search for the invariant components
of ethics. He seemed to find invariant components in his account of human cognition and
deliberation. He invited all to discover and verify his claim through his method of self-
appropriation. Lonergan regarded the drive towards self-understanding as fundamental to
good decision-making, especially if we arc to understand the nature of collective
responsibility. In Lonergan's view, a central component in the issue of collective
responsibility involves sorting out the relationship between ethical theory and moral
practice. Lonergan's contribution to the study of ethics is therefore primarily in the area
ofmctaethics. 1
While ethics is about the existential elements of deliberation, Lonergan maintains
that an aecount of human knowing is basic to understanding deliberation. It may be
1Metacthics is defined as tbe sludy ofhow practical ethics and lbeories relate toeachOlhcr. See RobertC.
SoloJmll, Morality and the Good Life: Anlnlroduction to £thicr Through Classical Source£, 2nd ed. (New
York: McGraw Hill, l.nc., 1992), S.
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argued that indeed any branch of systematic philosophy must have existential
underpinnings, tbat is, it must rest on some thcory of cognition and being. To explain
what it is to know, what conscious activities occur in the selfas a knower, is perbaps the
most basic foundation for any philosophy. But how do we know knowing? Lonergan
developed a method or practice for extricating and examining the elements of knowing,
which he calls self.appropriation.2 According to Lonergan, we all know in the same way.
However, we are not aJl aware of the process or the structure of how we know. Lonergan
not only otTers a philosophy or theory of knowledge but also a method through which his
audience may verify his claims. It is not good enough for people simply to be told about
how they know; they must be active explorers on the journey in order to fully appreciate
and appropriate the process of knowing. Lonergan is thus notable in his attempt to make
his philosophy his method and vice versa. By claiming that humanity shares in the
structure of knowing, and that this is verifiable through a particular method, LQnergan
suggests that there arc further characteristics we share that might facilitate identifying
common ground for ethical discussion.
Yet before we even get to the universality of knowing, there is a prior condition
that is also universal in human experience: we all wonder. Wonder is an orientation to
l Lonergan'~ firsl extensive treatment of the ~tructure ofkoowing is found in his book, Insight: If Study oj
Human Understanding. It has been said lhatlnsight should be used no so much as a philosophical treatise
lhanasall"aidlothepersonalapproprialionandobjectificationofone'sralionalself-consciousness"At
the same lime, while it may be lll()S! useful as a lype ofinteHectual do·il-yourself guide, it still weighs in
signifieantlyonlhephilosophiealscale,addressingthetechnicalqueslionsofeognitionalanalysis,
epiSlcmology, and meUlphysics. Sec Frank E. Budenholzer, "Science and Religion: Seeking a Common
Horuon," 356. See also Thomas J. McPanland. "Historicity and Philosophy: The Existential Dimension"
in Religion and Culture: E,.suys In Honoro!Bernard Lonergan, S.1., ed Timothy P. Fallon. S.S. and Philip
Boo Riley (Albany: SUIte University ofNew York Press, 1987), 109. Leduc summarizes the goals of
Insight thns: "to understand the human process orunderslanding, to examine the philosophical implications
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knowing; it is the unrestricted desire to know. It crosses all stages of life, an cultures,
and all eras of human civilization. The human slot)' has always been one of wonder and
as such is enshrined in everything we do: from the unworded infant fascination with the
world to the existential questions of a philosopher deep in thought; from the most
mundane questions of what to have for breakfast to the meditation on the puzzles of
quantum mechanics, the relevancy of religious narratives, or the achievement of world
peace. Wonder leads us to formulate questions; questions allow us 10 pursue knowledge;
and knowledge enables us to act, for better or for worse. Among the things we wonder
about is what to do and how 10 do it. These are the questions of ethics. Thus, an explicit
account of human knowing would better prepare us for deliberation and action and
improve the probability of producing better results, both for individuals and for Ihe
common good.
According to Lonergan there is an invariant structure to the process of knowing
Dcspite humanity's cultural and historical differences and the varying degrees of realized
potential in each of us, we are all equipped to know in the same way. J Knowing is a
matter of correctly understanding experience. This simple definition contains much that
needs to be unpacked before its full implications can be appreciated, Correctly
understanding experience is comprised ofa trio of operations, identified by umergan as
experiencing, understanding, and judging. This is only a part orthe story, however, As
will be explained in greater detail below, experiencing, understanding, and judging are
of achieving an understanding ofundl'rstanding, and to figbl againSI whal be ILonergan) calls 'the fligbt
from understanding'." Leduc, "Theology and Ecology: A Lonerganian Approach," 69.
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the operations which result in knowledge of fact or truth. They are tbe stuff of theoretical
reasoning, ofundcrslanding what something is and of figuring out the relation of one
thing to another; its end is only to know what a situation is. Practical reasoning is the
stuff of ethics, of wondering what to do about a situation and acting upon it. It has the
same structure as theoretical reasoning in its reliance on experience, understanding, and
judgment, but requires the extra component of deliberation. The role of deliberation will
be explored further on in this chapter, where we will discuss knowledge of value and the
structure of decision-making. For now we return to the basic structure of knowing
comprised of correctly understanding experience.
All of us are born into a world of immediacy: of unmediated sensation and of a
time known only as the present. Part of the maturation process is the mediation of this
sensory bombardment through words, language, symbols, meaning, a sense of past and
future, and an appreciation of the abstract, the ideal, the nonnative, and the fantastic.4 To
be aware of this process of increasingly differentiated consciousness within the self is a
first step in what umergan calls self-appropriation. It is through this process of
development that we become aware of ourselves and of how we are distinct from the
world. Though this may be a largely natural process of growing from a child to an adult,
1 However, as shall bl: discussed further on, the innate pancm of human knowing "does not coll'4JCl us to
follow its dictates." See l.W. Sullivan, "Lonergan, Conversion and Objectivity," Theology 86 (September
1983);348.Thisisa1soa~ssedlaterinthischapterinthedjscussiollonbiasesanddecline.
• Lonergall, !de/hod in TJteology, 28: Lonergan also applies this evolution from irruned.iacy to mediacy to
the development of culMes. ··Lower" cultures, although experiencing a world mediated by meaning, lack
control over meaning and arC steeped in the influence of magic and myth. "Higbcr" cultures develop
cOlltrols on meaning such as granunar, alphabets, logic, and philosophy. He also makes a distinction within
higher cullure between classical and modern higher culture; classical culture "thinks of the control as a
universal fixed for all time" while rnodern culture "thinks of the controls as rhemselves involved in an
ongoing process.·' Method il1 Theology, 28-29. From this di.s<;ussion ofinnnediacy versus mediacy in
culturc. loncrganproceeds to focus discussion fromlhe scale of culture 10 the scak oflheindividual.
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the degree of self-knowledge will vary, through circumstance or by choice.s
Compounding the development of self-knowledge is the component ofbelief: no one
person can know everything and so an account of knowing must accommodate the extra
element of belief, wh.ich will be discussed later on in the chapter. 6
One appropriates the operations of one's intentional consciousness. Operations,
things as basic as the five senses, are intentional in that they have objects. Sight intends
what is seen, hearing intcnds what is heard, and so on. For operations to occur they must
have an operator or a subject. Although the operations occur spontaneously, the point of
self-appropriation is to be aware ofthe conscious component ofoperation, and to be
aware of ourselves as operators or subjects. As noted above, in theoretical reasoning
there arc three levels of intentional consciousness: experience, understanding, and
judgment. Practical reasoning involves four levels: experience, undcrstanding,judgment,
and deliberation. Acts on each level are conditioned by their predecessor and collectively
these acts make up a nonnative pattern of operations which, when carried out properly,
result in "authentic" knowing. Being skilled in any pattern of operations, knowing what
they are and beginning to understand how they relate, whether it be the operations
involved in changing a tire, baking a cake, or being aware of the process of knowing,
enables the subject to mastcr the pattern and to build upon it.7
ltbid.,29.
~ MThe world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense e~periellceofall individual but by
tbc external and internal expcrienC<' ofa cultural community, and by the continuously checked and
rechecked judgments of the COmmUniIY. Koowing, accordillgly, is r>Otjust seeillg; it isexpcriencing,
understanding, judging, and believing." Lonergan, 'Theology in its New Context," 16.
1 On how skill begets mastery, see Lonergan, Me/hod ill Theology, 27-28. Loncrgao was inspired by the
workofPiagetwhosrndiedthepattemsofehilddevelopment.
40
It is on the first and most basic level of experience that we are open to data of two
kinds: of sense (that which is brought from the external world by the senses) and of
consciousness (the internal acts of the senses, the imagination, feelings evoked by the
data, and the mental operations of questioning, understanding, reasoning, deliberating and
choosing which are active in handling the data). However, raw experience in itselfhas
no meaning; it is an unmediated flow of data. Once we shift from the immediacy of an
infant to the world of meaning, the flow of data is mediated. This is the result of the
intervention or mediation by the process of knowing upon the flow of data. Oriented by
native wonder, we have questions about the data, such as ''what is it?" which lead to the
next level of consciousness, understanding. In attempting to understand experience, we
operate empirically, asking questions, coming up with answers, verifying our solutions.s
As lAmergan nOles, while data provoke inquiry, ''what is sought by inquiry is never just
another datum but the idea or fonn, the intelligible unity or relatedness, Ihat organizes
data into intelligible wholes."? Through this inquisitive process we arrive at a possible
answer; it is then that we arrive al the third level of consciousness, judgment. In judging
we reflect on the answer or solution we have hit upon; this reflection takes the basic fonn
of wondering "is it so?" or "is this a fact?" lfwejudge that it is not so, then we must go
back to asking more questions, rc-examining the data to see if we have taken everything
relevant to the question under consideration. Once we are able to judge that it is so, this
is the end of the process of knowing the facts.
I This parallels tbc structure of scientific method with its hypothesis, e)[perimentation, and verification.
Lonergan e)[plores this common ground between religion and science in his article, "Isomorphism of
Thomist and Scientific 1bought," in Collec/ioll, Colle.:led Works ofBcmard wnergan, Volume 4, cd
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M, Doran (TOroOlO: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 133·1.:11
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However, having gained knowledge of the situation, the practical side of ethics
prompts, "What now?" One may know the facts, but what is one to do with them? In
ethics, wonder becomes concern and the component of action demands that we move to a
fourth level of intentional consciousness called deliberation. It is here that we ask what
might we do or what should we do with the knowledge we have gained. A more detailed
discussion of deliberation will follow shortly.
Recurrent through the process of knowing are the acts of direct and reflective
insight. Exposed to data and oriented by wonder to ask questions about the data, we
come upon possible answers to make sense ofthe data; it is dircct insight which offers
answers to the question, "What is it?" Dirccl insight leads to images, definitions, or other
fonnulalions of possible answers. It stands to be veri fied in the further question, "Is it
so?" Direct insights arc not always correct, bUI they are necessary to understanding.
Similarly, reflective insights are necessary at the level ofjudgmenl. Reflective insight
compares the fonnulation against the data to detennine if there is a fit. The act of
judgment is the affimJation or denial of the fit. Reflective insight attempts to answer, "'s
it so?" and allows the judgment of fact to affirm or deny whether something is so. Thus
in Lonergan's model the structure of theoretical reasoning follows seven distinct acts
ovcr three levels:
1. exposure to data of sense and/or consciousness (at the level of experience)
2. asking of the data: "What is it?"
3. coming up with direct insights
4. fonnulating thought into words, images, ideas (at the level of understanding)
5. asking of the fonnulation, "Is it so?"
6. engaging in reflective insight
9 lAnergan, Method in Theology, to
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7. which grounds judgment of fact (at the level ofjudging)
The process is illustrated in the following diagram:
Figure 2.1: According to Lonergan, the structure of knowing consists of seven
distinct acts on three levels of consciousness. From Phenomenology and Logic: The
Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existetrt;alism, Collected Works
a/Bernard lAmergafl, Volume 18, ed. Philip McShane (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001), Appendix A, 323.
This threefold structure ofknowing-<lf experience, understanding, and judgment-
serves as the basis for what Lonergan calls "transcendental method." This refers to the
pattern of operations which characterize the act of knowing yet which are not confined 10
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any particular area of knowledge. 10 The cognitional structurc outlined above underlies
any instance of "authentic knowing."
As a guide to whal he calls "authentic" knowing, Lonergan identifies not only a
structure to the process but nonns for each level. In any inquiry, when presented with
data at the level ofexperience, we must be attentive, or else we miss relevant data. When
understanding, we must be intelligent in choosing the questions to ask. When judging,
we must be reasonable in weighing evidence and drawing conclusions. When
deliberating, we must be responsible in the values we affinn and in the courses of action
we decide upon, knowing that we are accountable for the choices we make. These four
directives are what Lonergan calls transcendental precepts.
2. Transcendence
Why is Ihis method understood as transcendent? When knowing is successful it
transcends, in the sense that the knower has gone beyond oneself and can understand the
world not just as it appears to the knower but also in tenus of how things are of
themselves, independent of the knower. Furthennore, oriented by wonder, or the
unrestricted desire to know, this method is described as an "eros of the mind... which
drives us ever onward toward transcendent knowledge."ll Yet the transcendental method
is more than just a pre-existing principle which ensures the cognitional cogs are in proper
working order; "it is a principle that leads us from ignorance to knowledge, It is the
'0 Budenholzer, "Science and Religion: Seeking a Conunon Horizon," 356
II Sullivan. Mumergan, CODversion and Obje<:livily." 346; Being able 10 wonder wilhoultimics thus points
10issuesofullima.lcmean.ing,issueslhaltr.lditionallyhavcbeenlbedomainof religion
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intention ofbeing:,12 Knowledge makes a di fference: it makes us fuller and better.
Lonergan believed Irnowing to be both an existential and a transcendental process: to
know is to bc and this brings us back to the existential foundations necessary for any
philosophy. But to Irnow is also to transcend oneself: to go beyond the level of sensory
experience in asking questions about it; to go beyond merely asking questions by
answering them; to go beyond mere answering of questions to act upon a decision made.
Deliberation adds an effective component to the process ofknowing.
Deliberation demands that a choice be made. Tn ethics, self-transcendence is even more
evident, especially when weighing the common good against individual intCTCSts: here, in
the deciphering of not just facts but of personal values or morals, the dimension of feeling
is added. Feelings infonn a great deal about values and this too is an existential
discovery: "With that discovery [that choosing between courses of action makes one an
authentic or an unauthentic human being; that you can either act consistently with what
you know or in contradiction to it], there emerges in consciousness the significance of
personal value and the meaning ofpcrsonal responsibility."13 Values are apprehended in
feelings. One makes a judgment of value after regarding the data which is presented in
feeling. For Lonergan, adding the religious component of love for the divine or
transcendent mystery takes the process even further, as shall be discussed in the next
chapter.
" Michael Rende, Lonergan an eanversion: The [)e,,'elapmem ofa NQ/ion (lanham, MD: University Press
afAmerica, 1991), 184.
1J1.01lcr8an,MelhadinTheo{agy,38.
45
With transcendental method, it is never enough just to do it; we must be aware of
the process. There are what Lonergan terms "neglected subjects" who do not know
themselves, or worse, "truncated subjects" who not only do not know themselves but also
do not know thcre is anything to know. In tllis case,
... to them the human mind isjus! a black box. The input is clear enough.
The output is clear enough. But the inner working is a mystery... when
one moves beyond the limits of commonsense competence, when one
wishes to have an opinion of one's own on larger issues, then one had best
know just what one is doing. Otherwise one 100 easily will be duped and
too readily exploited.14
According to this, il is in our own best interests not only to be informed as to what is
happening around us, but also to be just as well informed as to what is happening inside
us. To neglect the self as subject is to neglect the data which is relevant to moral
deliberation and whicll would also verify Lonergan's cognitionallheory. Just as
empirical science depends upon verification in the data of experience, the transcendental
method is verified in the data of consciousness, without which there could be no
knowledge at all.
3, An Introduction to Bias
Lonergan's account of cognitional processes throws new light on our estimation
of what knowing is and on other philosophical eITorts to account for the process of
knowing. By the same loken, knowledge of the cognitional process also opens up the
possibility oCknowledge of its deformation. Lonergan investigates this in his account of
bias. He identifies four types: blindspots, individual bias (egoism), group bias. and a type
oftemporal or general bias where long tenn consequences are overlooked for short teon
gain. A detailed discussion of bias and the decline which results from it will foHow in the
next chapter. In this context it is enough to state Lonergan's assertion that for too long
has the myth of knowing prevailed, a myth which says that: "knowing is looking,
objectivity is what can be seen, and reality is what's there.',ls Those who fall into the
trap of this myth are identified by Lonergan as one of several types. The naive realist
thinks knowing is looking; one knows somcthing just by taking a look at it. The
empiricist trusts only his or her senses: objectivity is equated only with sensory
experience, while understanding and judgment are considered subjective activities and
therefore not reliable. The idealist thinks knowing means having a concept of the real as
ideal. It is only what Lonergan calls the critical realist who can overcome these pitfalls to
realize that knowing is a self-transcending process, a process which is arduous and
demanding, but rewards the knower with a correct pattern of judgments. 16 The eritical
realist understands that knowledge is a complex, dynamic process involving acts of
experiencing, understanding, and judging. Knowledge is not obtained in just one
operation, such as seeing. Objectivity for the critical realist is not separate from
a Cited from a Ie<:ture entitled "Self-Transcendence: Intelle.:rual, Moral, Religious" which Lonergan
deli,'cred at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, October 10, 1974; quoted in Philip McShanc, Economics
for EveT}"One: DtIS JUJ KapiltJl (Halifax: Axial Press Inc., 1998), 157.
Il Bernard Lonergan, "Understanding and Iking: The Halifax l.ccrures on IIlJight," in Col/ecled Work! of
Bernard Lonergan, Yolume j, 2nd cd. (revised, augmenled), ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli
\r~n~r:~;~I%;J~o;;~;;'2~~~~~~oBudcDholzer, "Science and Religion: Sceldnga
Commoo Horizon," 359 and James I.l. Sauer, A Commentary on Lonergan·s Melhod in Theology, cd. Peter
L. Monette and Christine Jamieson (Ottawa: The Lonergan Website, www.lonergan.on.ca. 2oot), 242
Marsh lakes a somewhat more harsh position in his pronounceIlll'nt that naive realists, empiricists, and
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subjectivity.17 As a critical realist, one then rejects all incarnations of the myth, such as
objectivism, positivism, scientism, pragmatism, materialism, behaviorism, and all other
such "isms," In Lonerganian thought these tend to become confming ideologies which
deny the asking of certain relevant questions or whole classes of questions,lS
4. Knowing as Common Ground
Why begin with knowing? Knowing is basic to all human inquiry, whether it is
practical or theoretical, scientific or religious. In the introduction we examined some
ideas about why approaching the world and human affairs through an exclusively
scientific viewpoint is nOI enough, and why Lonergan believed religion must regain its
social role in the discussion. If it seems that science and religion separated long ago and
are only now gradually reconciling their differences, we can try to uncover somc
common ground. A potential starting point is the structure of knowing. For Lonergan,
knowing fact or truth means correctly understanding experience. So too for the scientist
does knowing fact mean verifying the hypothesis from the data, that is, correctly
idealists are positions "ofadull childrcn." "Praxis and Ultimate Reality: Intellectual, Moral and Religious
Conversion as Radical Political Conversion," 226.
11 Marsh, "Praxis and Ultimate Reality: IntelieclUal, Moral and Religious Conversion as Radical Political
Conversion," 226. It rnay prove a slUOIbling block for people to accept that objeclivity is inseparable from
subjectivity in terms oftbe knowing process. The test of Lonergan's theory, by asking "Am I a knower?~
neo:ssarily caters to both the selfas object (wondering whether I am a knower) and as inquiring subject
(wondering whether I am a lmowcr). Yet if we are ",-illing to test and accept the findings, according to
Budenholzer, ~our notion of the real world shifts dramatically. We have a tendency to presuDIC that the
reallyrealoonsistsin~hanlobjtctsofexperitnceandtbatinknowingwegetatrut picrure of those
realities. But, in raet, the real is simply .-erifled intelligibility -the real is the known, the object of
experience, understanding, and judgement." Budenholzer, "Science aoo Religion: Seeking a COOlmon
Horizon," 359.
II Lonergan, Method in Theology, 214; Marsh "Praxis and Ultimate Reality;' 226
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understanding experience. 19 Both scientific and religious studies demand continuity and
intelligibility in their disciplines. Even though the questions and the ends appropriate to
each are different, the structure and process of knowing is the same.20 Similarly, the
motivation for knowing, wonder, is common to scientific and religious perspectives. As
Budenholzcr notes, stirrings of awe, respect, and reverence for the way the world works
are experiences in both science and religion; however "the interpretations of those
experiences and the trajectory along which they develop will be quite diffcrent.,,21 Yet
scientific and religious interpretations need not, and some would argue, cannot, be
mutually exclusive. Budenholzer further notes, "The very teosions that have arisen in the
West between religion and science are themselves indicative of this scarch for unity."n
Much effort is now being put into narrowing whatever gap is perceived to exist between
science and religion. Using the structure of knowledge as a starting point, and
u:mergan's general empirical method dcmoostratcd in self-appropriation, seems a viable
place to begin building a common foundation.
Though Lonergan stresses the importance of self-appropriation, his account of
knowledge includes belief. One person cannot know everything, in thc sense of having
found out everything therc is to know on onc's own. Because we are limited in what we
can take in, process, and know, a large part of human living depends on belief. The body
l'wnergan,/llSighl,452.
III Foran intrOOuction to the commonalities between n:1igious thought and scientific me1hod,see
wnergan's article "Isomorphism ofThomist and S<;ientific Thought:' 133-141. Over its history, science
has been vulnerable to the "myth" of knowing. For example, despite its legacy in terms of developments in
the scientific method, the scienceofGalileo's day equaled wncrgan's"taking a good look" .....ith what
constitutes knowledge. Budenholzer, "Science and Religion: Seeking a Conunon Horizon," 353.
11 Budenho1zer "Science and Religion: Seeking a Common Horizon," 352.
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of knowledge humanity draws upon as part of its history, science, philosophy, medicine,
art, and so on, is a pool of collective knowledge. What one person knows in the fullest
sense of correctly understanding experience. the rest of us usually must take on belief.
For example, while reduplication of experiments is an important part of the verification
process, once scientists establish the validity of a theory they do not repeat it endlessly;
they are content to trust to an extent the previous findings of their predecessors. In
Lonergan's words: "Belief, then, is an essential moment in scientific collaboration.,,2J
Indeed, belief is an essential moment in any kind of collaboration:
Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession but rather a
common fund, from which each may draw by believing, to which each
may contribute in the measure tbat he pcrfonns his cognitional operations
properly and reports their results accurately. A man does not learn
without the use of his own senses, his own mind, his own heart, yet not
exclusively by these. He learns from others, not solely by repeating the
operations they have performed but, for the most part, by taking their word
for Ihe results. Through communication and beliefthere are generated
common sense, common knowledge, common science, common values, a
common climate of opinion. No doubt, this public fWld may suffer from
blindspots, oversights, errors, bias. But it is what we have got, and the
remedy for its short-comings is not the rejection of belief and so a return
10 primitivism, but the critical and selfless stance that, in this as in other
matters, promotes progress and offsets dec1inc?4
Thus, belief, as another form of knowing, adds a communal aspect to the structure of
knowing. As such, the questions we fonnulate from an initial unworded wonder are
influenced by the environment, both natural and communal, in which we live. We are a
communal species by nature and although Lonergan notes thai it is up to us to decide for
11 Ibid., 364. ~e also Geald L. Schroeder, The Science ofGod, 5, where he notes that consistency of
nature is a basic tenet ofbolhscientific inquiry and biblical religion.
1JLonergan,lrzsight,4S3
,. Lonergan, Mc/hod in Theology, 4344.
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ourselves what to make of ourselves,2S he asserts that we also must be mindful that how
we act and live inOuences others around us and vice versa. Beliefis essential to
umergan's notion of the human good; the human good is discussed extensively in
Method in Theology and will provc to have import in our discussion of environmental
ethics. 26 This will be taken up in the next chapter.
5, From Knowledge to Action
However, neither belief nor knowing of themselves tell us how to decide or act.
Ethics is about more than just knowing. Ethics demands that the knower make a decision
and take action once the facts of the situation are known. Ifwonder motivates knowing,
the driving force behind ethics is concern. Previously we spoke oftheorctical reasoning
and the threefold structure of knowing made up of experience, understanding, and
judgment. An allusion was also made to a fourth level of consciousness known as
deliberation.27 The fourth level moves reasoning from a theoretical plane to a practical
plane because, in Lonergan's view, deliberation necessarily implies considering courses
of action. The ethical process which arises is a present choice directed towards a future
action; being future oriented, by its nature, it can only deal in probabilities rather than
certainties.28
n This is a trademark phrase ofLoliergan's; see Me/hod in Theology, 121 aDd "Dimensions ofMeaning,"
243.
U On the human good. sce Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology, chapter 2, particularly pages 47-55 for a
discussionofthc structure ofthc good
11 See l3ruce Anderson, "'Discovery' in Practicall'lohlem-Solving" in "Discovery" in Legal Decision-
Mati/Ig (Boston: Kluwer Academic Puhlishcrs, 1996), 131-142.
1ll SiJuilarly, scicnce, or indeed any discipline whicb subscribes to a gcneralized empirical rnethod,also
deals iu prohabilities
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In introducing the fourth level of deliberation, Lonergan's model of practical
reasoning builds upon his previous model; it uses the seven acts and three levels of
theoretical reasoning as its foundation to detennine the facts of a situation and then adds
another layer. The judgment of fact becomes the "data" for the process, but rather than
ask, "What is it?" we ask, "What is to be done?" Direct insight suggests possible courses
of action, which are subject to the question "Is it 10 be done?" Reflective insight lights
the way to ajudgment of value (at the level of deliberation). Previously we itemized the
seven acts operative in the structure of wonder or theoretical reasoning; the structure of
ethics or practical reasoning builds upon these seven acts and is followed by the
remaining six:
8. questions for deliberation
9.direcl insight
10. detennining possible courses of action
II. questions for judgment of value
12. reflective insight
13. judgment of value
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Figure 2.2: The structure of doing incorporates thirteen distinct acts (including the
seven from the structure of knowing) at three levels of consciousness. From
Phenomenology and Logic: The Bostoll College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and
Existentialism, Collected Works ofBernard Lonergan, Volume 18, cd. Philip
McSbane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), Appendix A, 324.
AI; mentioned above, deliberation takes into consideration feelings in general and
concern in particular. They are data relevant to the judgment of value, the same way that
sense and consciousness are data relevant to judgments offaet. Feelings are
apprehensions of value. Values are what detcnnine how we act in any given situation.
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Deliberation gives us a chance to reflect on what we value and on how those values affect
our actions. On feelings, Loncrgan is adamant that we tunc into them:
...it is much betler to take full cognizance of one's feelings, however
deplorable they may be, than 10 brush them aside, overrule them, ignore
them. To take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know
oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility
thai gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant
attitude.29
Accounting for feelings is an essential part of self-appropriation. In addition, by
"feelings" Lonergan does not mean the merely transicnt kind which vanish when our
attcntion shifts to somelhing else, such as impatience, amusement, fright, or surprise.
There are abiding feelings "so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced,
that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life:,JO The ultimate
example of this is loving, where "mutual love is the intertwining of two lives. It
transfonns an 'I' and 'thou' into a 'we' so intimate, so secure, so pemanent, that each
attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for both:,Jl The supreme
expression of a loving relationship for Lonergan is this I-Thou of religion, the
relationship of unrestricted love between God and hurnans.Jl This I-Thou relationship
19Lonergan,Mclhodill Theology,3J.
10 Ibid., 32
)'Ibid,,33
31 Lonergan was influenced by thc work of Friedrich Heiler from the Ilistory of religions school,
pariicul.arly by Heiler's essay "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions"
(in The JlistoryofReligions: Essays in Methodology, ed. Mircea Eliadc and Joseph Kitagawa [Chicago:
Uni\'crsityofChicago Press, 1959], 142-153). Heiler outlined seven fcatures shared by the world's major
religions, these being, in Lonergan's words, '''that there is a lTanscelldent reality; that he [sic] is immallCnt in
human hearts; thaI he is love, mercy, compassion; that the way 10 him is repentance, self·denial, prayer;
thalthc way is loveofone's neighbor, c\'en of one's encmies; that lhe way is love of God, so that bJiss is
conceived as knowledge of God, UIIion wilh him, or dissolution into him," Method in Theology, 109. It is
this transcultural common groulld betwccn the world's religions which greally interested Lonergan in his
later writing, particularlylhe notion ofunrestrictcd loving, which is integral to Loncrgan's notion of
rcligiousconversiolL
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based on love has been integral to Christian discussions of environmental ethics
particularly in the covenantal and stewardship traditions.3)
6. Values, Freedom, and Horizons
Ifvalues arc mediated in part by feelings they also fonn a hierarchy, identified by
Lonergan in the ascending order of vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values.:l-I
In the first chapter, Lonergan's notion of a hierarchy of values was introduced. It was
noted that Lonergan's hierarchy of values parallels Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Human
beings have desires and needs to be fulfilled, and these, according to Maslow, must be
met in a scale ofpreference. However, while this hierarchy of needs may be structured
generally from thc most basic physically (e.g., food, shelter, good health) to the most
complex emotionally, psychologically, and spiritually (e.g., the need to preserve life, the
need for approval, the need for love), the range of human needs is quite diverse and
potentially conflicting. If we were governed by needs and made decisions based solely
on satisfaction of needs and desires, there would not be much to differentiate us from the
rest of the animal world, where instincts and need-satisfaction dominate. That we are
concerned about the potential conflict of needs and that we tend to seek compromise
suggests there are more things to take into consideration. Lonergan's hierarchy of values
encompasses systems which meet our needs, but he adds the component of value which
organizes and prioritizes how those needs are met. If we are oriented to particular values,
II s~ Rosemary Radford Ruether, '''I"h«Ilogical Resources for Earth-Heating: Covenant and Sacrament,"
in The Challenge o/Global Stewardship: Roman Cat/wlu Responses, ed. Maura A. Ryan and Todd David
Whiunore (Notrl: Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, t997). 54·66. especially her discussion Oil
the contributions ofsacramentality stemming from an I-Thou outlook.
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that orientation will favour certain methods of meeting our needs over others; moreover,
consistent orientation to value will provide a certain overarching unity and cohesiveness
to social and cultural organization. For example, if equality of all people is valued
generally in a community, one would expect the social and cultural organization of that
conununity to reflect that. Other examples have been listed in the discussion of values
and needs in chapter one.
The hierarchy of values is integral to Lonergan's discussion on transcendence.
Each successive level, beginning with vital values, demands that people look beyond
solely their own needs. Vital values conccrn cooperation for atlaining basic needs such
as food and shelter. Social values account for the fact that human beings order their
communities. Cultural values suggest that people do more than make a living. Personal
values acknowledge the uniqueness and freedom of choice of the individual. Religious or
ultimate values claim that we are concerned with more than just day-to-day personal and
inlerversonal business; we arc oriented towards transcendence and mystery. Yct by
transcendence Lonergan also docs nOI just mean "beyond human being"; Sauer argues
that Lonergan generally means ''beyond where one is, i.e., exceeding prescnt
achievements."n In this intervretation, Lonergan's challenge of self-transcendence
demands that we do better than we did yesterday, that we continue to build upon what we
make of ourselves. Although for Lonergan, this ultimately points towards God who is
beyond human being, this gencrdl interpretation of transcendence does not require any
J<ll.onergan,MelhQdin Theology,3l
II Sauer, 246.
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specific religious orientation, and so offers a potential common starting point for the
religious and non~religious alike?6
Lonergan makes the distinction bctween self-regarding feelings, which are
pleasures, pains, desires, and fcars, and disinterested feelings which recognize cxeellenee
in values like health and strength, beauty, successfully functioning social order, combat
against decline, and self-sacrificing love.31 He claims that using only the criterion of
personal agreeableness or disab'feeableness in making our decisions is misleading, for
"fwJhat is agreeable may very wcB be what also is a true good. But it also happens that
what is a true good may be disagreeable_,,38 Yet certain people are willing to submit to
the disagreeable ifit is for the greater good. What truly is good does not always feel
good; so while feelings reveal values-sometimes wrenchingly, as Lonergan notes-it is
those values which move us towards self-transcendence. For the sake of those values we
would be willing to transcend ourselves, and transcend disagreeable feelings in the
process.39
J6 Thcre is always the problem oftmlancing pursuit oftranseetxlenee with appreciation ofimmanencc, a
dichotomy which has long been at the hean ofclashes between lhe secular and thc religious. Oftentimes
religion has becn accused of focusing so much on thc transcendent (in the scnse ofbeyolld human being)
!hat the worldliness or immanence ofour existence is undcrvalued. On tbe one hand, o,-eremphasizing
transcendence relcgatcs God 10 being a distant, wucachable deity whose presence callIl<)r be seen in our
daily livcs. On !he other hand, it has been argued that overemphasis On immanence tips llte scales 100
much Oll the sidc of secularism, where "loss of reference to the transcendent will rob symbol, ritual, recital
of their proper meaning to leave them merely idol and magic and myth." Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology,
III.
17 L!mcrgan, "Natural RighI and HiSlorical Mindedncss;' 173.
II Lonergan, Melhvdin Theology, 31.
19 lbid.; As Lonergan's hierarchy ofvalllcs parallels Maslow·s hierarchy of needs, another parallel may be
drawn bet"..een Lonergan's IlOtion of development and psychologist Lawrence Kohlbcrg's thrce stagcs of
moral development: preconventional, conventional, post-coovenlional. See Lawrence Kohlbcrg, The
Psychology ojMorol Developmenl: The Nalure and Validity ojMorol Sloges, 1st ed (San Fransiseo: Harper
& Row, 1984)
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However important feelings are as data for understanding vaJues and as the will's
momentum, Lonergan acknowledges that they cannot of themselves bring about
commitment. If feelings initiate the process of deliberation in ethics, commitment is
what finalizes deliberation. Here Lonergan discusses human freedom and the potential
for slraying away from commitment:
For commitment is a personal act, a free and responsible act, a very open-
eyed act in which we would settle what we are to become. It is open-cyed
in the sense that it is consciously a decision about future decisions, aware
that the best of plans cannot control the future, even aware that one's
present commitment however firm cannot suspend the freedom that will
be exercised in ils future execution.oW
Freedom is an essential notion in Lonergan's philosophy. In introducing the
fourth level of consciousness as deliberation and asserting its importance to the field of
ethics, Lonergan accounts for the role of freedom: "One has to have found out for oneself
that one has to decide for oneself what one is to makes of oneself; one has to have proved
oneself equal to that moment of existential decision; and one has to have kept on proving
it in all subsequent decisions, if one is 10 be an authentic human person:041 Authentic
living and self-detennination go hand-in-hand. However, we must note that Ihere are two
twes of freedom: what Lonergan calls horizontaJ freedom and vertical freedom. Setf-
detennination has elements ofboth.42 Horizonlal freedom refers to choices made within
the bounds ofa horizon with Ihe result of new answers to old questions. Vertical
freedom refers to our ability to change our horizons, to ask completely new questions and
search oul the new answers.
..., Lonergan, ~Naru.ral Right and Historical Mindedness,~ 173.
"Lonergan,Ml!thoditl71lr%gy, 121.
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Horizons are defined literally as "a maximum field of vision from a detenninate
standpoint.',4] Horizons may be considered in the fact that for each of us the world is
bounded by the limits of what we know and which questions we ask. 44 Horizons may
expand or shift (or indeed, shrink) depending on what we experience, how we interpret
the experience, bow our assumptions are challenged, and how open we are to
development. The choices we make express our commitments. Horizons arc the span of
knowledge in which we make our deliberations. However, we also choose our horizons
ourselves and as such are responsible for them. 4S One exercises freedom in taking a
stance and selecting a horizon in which to live, whether implicitly or explicitly.
Lonergan notes that many of us do not take advantage of this freedom to choose
horizons and change horizons. much to the detriment of our personal and communal
growth: "deliberate decision about one's horizon is high achievement. For the most part
people merely drift into some contemporary horizon. They do not advert to the
multiplicity of horizons. They do not exercise their vertical liberty by migrating from the
one they have inherited to another they have discovered to be better.'.46 This drift runs
counter to "authentic" living, for living authentically means staying true to the
transcendental precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. To
abdicate the responsibility to choose and to not exercise this vertical1iberty is to cheat
oneself out of the opportunity 10 develop into a better person.
'1 Sauer, 69.
013 Sudenholzer "Science and R.etigion,' 352-353
.. Ibid., 352
4l Sauer, 24Q-241
.,.; Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology, 269
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Freedom of choicc and self-detennination are linked to change. As mentioned in
the introduction, Lonergan was interested in change, and more importantly, with
development, evidenced in his interest in history and in his perception of a "troubled
consciousness" in our time. Change is a feature of experience and can be either positive
or negative. Development concerns intelligent deliberation and aims at authentic
progress. Change occurs in human society with a shift in the controls of meaning. A
change in meaning has long range effects. So too, change may occur on an individual
basis, when an individual experiences a personal shift in meaning. Change is a constant
possibility and is inevitable for most people trying to live "authentic" lives. However,
lasting and "authentic" development can only come about when a person is clear on
where he or she stands right now. OthelWise. when confronted with something new, and
the consequent choice to accept or reject the new, one risks making an arbitrary and ill-
prepared decision and thus ''relinquishing the task of establishing coherent meaning in
Iife.',47 This is why Lonergan considered it important to pay attention to how we know.
This introspection and self-appropriation sheds light on what, how, and why exactly we
know.
7. An Introduction to Conversion
At thisjunclurc it is fitting to introducc the concept of conversion, which is the
crux of this thesis and indeed of much of Lonergan's writing. Conversion is a loaded
tcnn in loday's society, often conjuring up images offundamentaJist exhortations,
'7 Brian V. Johnstone, "The Experience of Conversion and the Foundations of Moral Theology;· Eglise et
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missionary work, sudden and dramatic changes oflifestyle. Those wary of the tenn may
suspect an element ofcoercion in any conversion experience. Lonergan adopts a more
nuanced view. Rathcr than undcrstanding it in a sectarian sense as concern for changing
others, Lonergan believes it must first begin with the self.
Conversion is necessary when there is a gap between experience and reality.
Sometimes the gap may be closed simply, with the addition ofrnore infonnation. lfan
experience is more than a passing "happening" and turns out to be something more
profound, in order to integrate this new profundity into one's life one must assess the
measure of unity and cohesion of one's previous interpretations of life experiences. The
experience of something new, especially something profound, often makes one more
aware of where one stands. This awareness, held up against a new experience, either
leaves one affinning that life is as one has assumed it to be, or else forces a re~evaluation
by radically challenging one's assumptions.48 Lonergan argues that such circumstances
demand much: grasping a new level of consciousness, re-shaping one's life meaning,
altering one's desires and goals - things which require a total personal transfonnation.49
In tenus of horizontal and vertical freedom conversion is an exercise of vertical freedom,
a change between horizons, nol within a horizon.so Conversion is also more than any
particular change or any particular development; it is a "radical transfonnation on which
follows, on all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and developments. What
hitherto was unnoticed becomes vivid and present. What had been of no concern
ThiologieIS(MayI984):181.
"Ibid.
·'!bid.
""'Lonergan, Method in Theology,237-238.
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becomes a matter of high import."'l It is a transformation where "[ilt is as irone's eyes
were opened and one's former world faded and fell away:,j2 Moreover, despite the fact
that conversion may be punctuated or first noticed explicitly through sudden insights or
"momentous judgments and decisions," 1Alnergan asserts that it is a prolonged process. It
is a progressive deepening and broadening of the self and the seWs understanding of the
world where previous knowledge and commitment is used as the foundation for further
building. It may also involve a "wrenching" that sees those previous judgments and
commitments obliterated.'J Neithcr conversion nor the self-appropriation vital to
convcrsions4 can be confined to the pages of a book or bc achieved through belonging to
a special group.s, Conversion and self-appropriation are fundamentally matters of human
existence, in this case a "heightened grasp" ofit.s6 80th are intensely personal.
Conversion gives us new selves to understand; a new understanding of self also
leads to a modification in understanding the things around us. Lonergan says: "The
convert apprehends differently, values differently. relates differently because he has
become different. The new apprehension is not so much a new statement or a new set of
statements, but rather new meanings that attach to almost any stalement. It is nol new
values so much as a transvaluation ofvalues:,s1 Nevertheless, conversions are not
J' wnergan, "The<:>IQgy in its New COlllc>;I,"13
Jlwnergan,Melhodin Theoi<>gy, 130
'l Marsh, "PralCis and Ultimate Reality," 225.
.. 11li5 is IlOt to imply a prederermined order of conversion in rerms ofwnergan's idenlificationof
intellectual, morat, andreligiousoonversiolL Self-appropriation is vital tooonversion but it is not
ne<:essarily the impetus for conversion. A discussion on the "order" on conversion and the relationship
between the three types follows in chapter three; see also Rende, Lonergan on ConverSion: The
Devdopmem ofa Notioll.
URende, 156.
JliRende, 156.
'1 Lonergan, 'Theology in its New Context," 13
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arrived at by a process of logic. The change is a radical shift in one's horizon. That
revision of stance then goes on to affect all other aspects of how one thinks and
perceives. It "enriches [one's] understanding, guides [one's] judgments, reinforces
[one's] decisions.'~!
Above we addressed the gradual and normal maturation from infant to adult in
tenns of cognitional development. Like cognitional development, conversion is an
ongoing process. But conversion also implies more than cognitional development. It is
not just about broadening our horizons or expressing ourselves in bigger words.
According to Butler "[ilt implies an aversion, a change of direction and a consequent
total reconstruction of our existence, a reconstruction not to be achieved without pain,
and even a repudiation of, and 'death' to, our former existence.',59 For Lonergan,
conversion must have positive connotations or else it is not authentic. Authentic
conversion means consonancc between people's knowledge, thoughts, and actions in
accordance with the transcendental precepts.
Lonergan identifies three types of conversion: intellectual conversion, moral
conversion, and religious conversion. Religious conversion will bc addressed in the
following chapter. The other types of conversion, intellectual and moral, have been
alluded to, without calling them as such, in the discussion on the four levels of
consciousness. It is expanding upon intellectual and moral conversion which will be the
focus of the remainder ofthis chapter.
If wonder, defined as the pure desire to know, is the orientation for knowing, then
II Lonergan, Melhodill The%gy, 131
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"[i]ntellectual conversion is the discovery of the significance of the pure desire to
know.,,60 The pure desire to know is the fuel which drives our questioning and which
pervades and guides all our cognitional operations,'l Intellectual conversion weaves
together several threads of thought thus far addressed, It begins with self-appropriation
and the knowing ofk:nowing, that is, being aware of and comprehending the structure and
process of authentic knowing as discussed above in the levels of experience,
understanding, and judgment. Lonergan establishes his opposition to the myth of
knowing ("that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen
and not seeing wllat is not there, and that the real is what is oul there now to be looked
at:>6l) and in so doing demonstrates how intellectual conversion works. He defines
intellectual conversion as a "radical clarification" which results in the elimination of the
myth ofknowing,6J A suitable philosophical analogy is that of Plato's Cave. As the
cave-dweller believed shadows on a wall constituted what was real, so too the
intellectually unconverted believe knowing to be merely looking. As the cave-dweller
emerges into the sunlight to realize what is truly real, so too the intellectually converted
know knowing to bc the threefold structure of experience, understanding, and judgment.64
Because he claims a recognition of authentic knowing, Lonergan himsclfis the prime
example of intellectual conversion and so is seen to prove his point by example.65
19 B.C. Butler, "Bernard Lonergan and Conversion," Worship 49 (June·July 1975) : 330
""Rende, 183.
61 {bid.
6l Lonergan, Method in Theology, 238
6J 1bid.
.. Marsh, "Praxis and Ullimate Realily." 229.
~ Conn notes that Inl"ighl "lIS dedicated 10 lhe lask of intelleclual conversion. Walter E. Conn, ·'Bernard
Lonergan's Analysis of Conversion," Angeficum 53, no.3 (1976): 367
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The intellectually converted recognize and try to practice consistently the norms
of Icnowing: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. One freely
chooses 10 accept these precepts and so freedom is an integral component of intellectual
convcrsion.66
As intellectual conversion discovers the pure desire to know, moral conversion
discovers the importance of disinterested or impartial feeling. As mentioned before,
feelings reveal values. Lonergan defines moral conversion as "when one chooses and
decides according not to satisfactions, but rather values, or what is truly good.'.67 Where
satisfaction and values conflict, value will be preferred. Self-intercsted feelings will
defer to disinterested feelings. As intellectual conversion is the pursuit of truth, so moral
conversion is the pursuit of value. Values deal in what ought to be, not necessarily in
what is so. Because of this, moral conversion is oriented towards commitment and action
to bring about what ought to be. It transcends the here and now and drives us to
reinterpret our relationships with each other and the world around US. 68
Freedom is also an essential element of moral conversion, since moral conversion
is another exercise of vcrtical freedom. According to Lonergan, the morally unconverted
live life to fulfil their needs and desires; self-satisfaction infonns all decision-making.
Morally converted people transcend themselves because decisions are now made
according to a new set of criteria which revolve around value. Included in this is the
.. Marsh, "Ptuis and Ultimate Reality," 225
'" Looergall, Method in Theology, 240
.. James J. Walter, ~The Foundations ofChristian MoraJ Experience," Eglise el Thoologie t6 (May t 985) :
170
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asking of ''radically new existential questions about the meaning of persons" which
includes not only the selfbm others.69
Moral conversion is more than just asking questions, however. We need to add
the component of action, for it is not enough just to know (like the intellectually
converted) what is true and good; Lonergan was adamant thai one must be consistent
between what one knows and how one acts in order to fulfil his definition of
authentieity.70 We must note as well that moral conversion is not a singular event. It is
"a commitment to never-ending self-improvement," because even after one is morally
converted one must constantly battle bias. In Lonergan's words, "[a] conversion does not
result in perfection but rather in an awareness of or sensitivity to what ought to be.,,71
This includes "conquering the jungle of personal prejudices and biascs, ...developing
knowledge of concrete human realities and possibilities of scrutinizing the scalc of
preferences, ...listening to criticism and protest, ...[and]lcaming from others."n
Although explored in a Christian context, Lonergan's notion of conversion may
be applied to non-religious contexts, according to some scholars.n The transcultural
applicability Lonergan sought in formulating his cognitional theory appears
straightforward enough in terms of knowing. To be intellectually converted means to
consciously accept the premise which stales that knowing is correctly understanding
experience. It is also an acknowledgment of the related precepts: be anentive, be
intclligent, be reasonable, be responsible. Lonergan argued that it is within the grasp of
69 Ibid"179.
10 Marsh, "Praxis and Ulrimate Reality:' 229
l' Lonergan,Melhooi" Theology,240
7:l Johnstone, 'The Experience o(Conversion and the Foundations of Moral Theology: 197
66
all human beings to live by the precepts, and he did nol call upon any specific doctrine or
dogma or tradition to make this point. Similarly, it seems that an orientation to
deliberating upon and choosing values by which to live, regardless ofwbat those
panicular vaJues may be, is a point common to all Ilumanity. Defining and discussing
moral orders has occupied human thought for millennia. Again, Lonergan's position
does not depend upon any panicular faith tradition. Human beings value, and it is our
responsibility to choose value over mere satisfaction if we want to live authentically.
However, Lonergan is now to claim that sustained moral conversion can only really
come about once we fall in love. Conn, explaining Lonergan, adds that to be in love is
the only way to "escape the centripetal force of our persistent egocentric gravity.',74 This
being in love is what Lonergan chooses to call "religious conversion." The label alone
may be enough to tum some non-religious away and make non-religious and religious
alike jump to cenain assumptions. Lovc is a complex subject at the best of times,
occupied in multi-purpose usc in common, contemporary, and secular contexts, and its
use in combination with the notion ofconversion merits some clarification and reflection.
It is this task that we tum to explore in the next chapter.
8. Summary
The study of conversion is meant to demonstrate a viable framework from which
to discuss issues of ethics. Lonergan begins with a focus on a cognitional theory
highlighting the invariance of human knowing and the importance of self-appropriation.
1l Walter, "The Foundations ofChrisIi an Moral E",po;,rlcnce," 177
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This sets the stage for an exploration of collective responsibility. His cognitional theory
enables him to posit the possibilities of and necessity for intellectual conversion and the
criteria for veri fying if intellectual conversion has occurred. The transcendental precepts
serve as nonus for "authentic" knowing and for determining how intellectual conversion
might occur. Lonergan's attention to moral conversion emphasizes self-transcendence,
where one chooses to defer to value over one's own satisfactions. The allusion has
already been made that for Lonergan the ultimate fonu of self-transcendence is loving
without restriction. It will be argued that this too has cross-cultural applicability.
Conversion, like ethics, necessarily entails decisions about action; not only tbat,
but it demands consonance between thought and action. This is the crux of Lonergan's
notion of conversion. We will now explore the role of love in achieving this consonance.
lfquoledinibid.,t80
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Chapter Three: ConvenioD
In the preceding chapter I introduced the notion of conversion and two of the
three types of conversion Lonergan identified. This chapter will introduce Lonergan's
notion ofreligious conversion and further explore its relevance in the context of
Lonergan's views of the human good and societal progress and decline. We will proceed
with an eye towards setting up the question in the final chapter of whether there might be
an approach to Roman Catholic environmental ethics from a Lonerganian viewpoint. I
1. Declioe
If the human condition werc perfect, there would be no need to discuss
conversion. However, the human condition is always in a state of tension between what
it is and what it can or ought to be, between authenticity and inauthenticity. If we arc in a
constant slate of flux, it is nol enough to speak of conversion as change; rather it is
development Wldcr certain guidelines or noons. In all human endeavours, there is
progress and decline. So too in the messy business ofconversion is there achievement
and failure, compromise and conflict. First there is tension within an individual between
1 Conversion seems to be a rccurring theme On which Lonergan worked over the years in his ",Tiling.
According to Rende, the notion ofreligious conversion was introduced flnt in Groce and Freedom;
Verbumhiotedattbc:notionofinlellectualconversionandtheideawasdeveloped1TKlre fuUy in Insight.
Method in Theology on the onc hand madc the distinction between intellcctual, moral, and religious
conversionandontheothcrhandunifiedtbemintermsofconsidcringthcmaslypcsofself-transcendence
Rende, 173. Lonergan described conversion sc\"eral difTcrcnl ways overhiscateet: in terms ofgracc in
Gra<:e and FreeMm, in terms or"intellecruallight" in Verbum, as reflective self.appropriation ofthc
subjcct io Insight, and as a movement into the horizon orthe transcendenlal notions in Method in Theology.
Rende 178. Rende funhcr claims that although refcrences to conversion became prominent only in the
latter part of Lonergan's carecr when it bel;amc a foundation for his theological method, the notion had
early beginnings and tlndery,'entconsidernble development over the years. Rende 212.
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what one is and what one can be, even if one is open to conversion. There is also the
equally difficult tension between the converted and the unconverted trying to relate to
each other. In the previous chapter we noted Lonergan's description of intellectually
converted and unconverted ways ofthinking as seen by contrasting the critical realists
with naive realists, idealists, and empiricists. Each way ofthinking is opposed to the
other. Sauer further elaborates, calling the positions dialectical; according to him,
"[r]esolving dialectical difference is not a mailer of more data or a change in perspective
but a vertical shift in horizon that is possible only with conversion.,,2 So, for example, in
Western society, we would not just need to sort out a plurality of views, but we would
also need to consider the authenticity and inauthenticity in each. Authenticity is guided
through following the transcendental precepts. In Lonerganian thought, conversion is the
real key to knowledge and the lack of conversion is the real cause ofmisunderstanding.3
Within a community, there will exist both the converted and unconverted, the authentic
and the inauthentic. Despite exposure to the same philosophy and traditions, individuals
may nevertheless find it hard to relate to each other. The possibilities for relating
intelligently and responsibly would seem to present even more of a challenge in a society
of plural views, where the potential for misunderstanding is significant.
Why is there such variance in human authenticity? If freedom is an essential part
of the human condition, of choosing one's horizon and allowing one to subsequently
change that horizon, then there are two sides to the coin. Free will and the consequences
ofhee will may either help or hinder one's path of conversion. Free will allows for both
, Sauer, 242-243.
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wise and unwise decisions. Thus, if we carry with us the potential for conversion and
progress, we also carry the risk of collapse. Ifprogress is something that is built up
slowly and with great effort on the part of the individual and a society, decline comes
much more easily. If self-transcendence promotes progress, then it is the refusal of self·
transcendence that leads to decline.4 Conversion is generally hard to attain; Lonergan
concedes that intellectual conversion is neither easy to grasp as a concept nor easy to
verify ifand when it has occurred. Similarly, the values demanded by moral conversion
may be noble, but the pull of less-than-noble endeavours and desires is often stronger.
Finally, raising the question of the relevance of religion to the common good may seem
futile in a contemporary society exposed to a wide array of views which all compete for
some measure of authority.
There are then several general obstacles which impede genuine progress,
according to Lonergan.~ These are referred to as biases, of which there are several types:
dramatic, individual, group, and general. Dramatic biases, commonly called blindspots,
are "aberration[s] of understanding," owing to often unconscious censorship of relevant
questions and insigbls.6 Blindspots restrict the full range of possibilities, of questions and
answers. The effects of this are long ranging. When one ignores or is nol open to
insight, it is not just an isolated oversight: ''To exclude an insight is also to exclude the
further questions that would arise from it, and the complememary insights that would
earry it towards a rounded and balanced viewpoint. To lack that fuller view results in
l Sullivan, "Lonergan, Con\'ersion and Objectivity." 349
• Lonergan, /lfe/hodin Theology, 55.
l For a more delailed discussion, see Lonergan, Me/hod In Theology, 52·55, and fnsigh/, chapleTS 6 and 7.
6 Lonergan, Insight,2tS
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behavior that generates misunderstanding both in ourselves and in others...7 Such
blindspots have a cumulative effect and make it increasingly harder for one to live
authentically, to live attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly. The second
obstacle is bias, of which there are several types. One may be individually biased, that is,
one may be an egoist, where one's own interests, desires, needs, and satisfactions come
first, to the disregard of others. This parallels Kohlberg's first stage of development, ofa
self-centred preconventional morality. There may be group bias, where loyalty to one's
group is matched by hostility towards other groups. Group bias, like individual bias, is
an interference with the development of common sense.8 Either type of egoism,
individual or group, conflicts with what Lonergan calls the good of order, or the social
structures ofa society.9 Bias also may be temporal, or what Lonergan tenns general bias,
in the sense of excessive concentration on short-tenn goals and benefits to the detriment
of the consequences in the long_tenn. IO Unfortunately, biases are easy to keep and hard
to correct.
When biases occur on a societal scale, then, in Lonergan's words,
A civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relentless consistency.
It cannot bc argued out of its self-destructive ways, for argument has a
theoretical major premiss, theoretical premisses are asked to confonn to
matters offact, and the facts in the simation produced by decline more and
more arc the absurdities that proceed from inattention, oversight,
unreasonableness and irresponsibility.11
1Ibid., 214
'Ibid., 247
• Lonergan, Method ill Theology, 54.
lU Ibid., 53
"Ibid., 55
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If biases have existed from the beginning, they contribute to a longer cycle of decline.
The biases in a Christian context constitute sin. The propensity to sin is understood to be
a natural part of the human condition. However, Lonergan believed there to be a longer
cycle of decline at work, meshed with the "troubled consciousness" of contemporary
times. This l~nger cycle "is characterized by the neglect of ideas to which all groups are
rendered indifferent" so thaI fresh insights which could contribute to progress end up
being ignored by the general populace. So it is that as hard as one tries to remain true to
the transcendental precepls, sometimes the environment in which one operates is mired in
attitudes of decline which perpetuate a deteriorating situation,ll Biases raise the problem
ofeviJ. For Lonergan, humankind is nol inherently evil. Evil arises from an absence of
moral self consciousness in the structure of knowing: knowledge may develop and
increase, but a moral consciousness does not keep pace. Evil also arises from systematic
human bias which prevents people from seeking and creating value: if we are not open to
asking questions and pursuing answers, wc will ncglect the full range of possibilities for
value in human existence. 13 Biases cause evil because they prevent us from grdSping and
acting upon the truth and authentic value. Simply put, evil arises from a failure to be
responsible,
U This applies as much to culnu-es as to religions. Sullivan Il(ltes: '"One ofthe most valuable features of
Lonergan's emphasis on the crucial role ofeonveTsion... is his concern for a critical authenticity on the part
oftbe subj«lparticipating in the learning process. Forjust as individuals can be inauthentic in their
religious stance, SO too can religious traditions lose their authcnticity inrelationtothcirroots.Self-critical,
authentic subjects within a tradition, intellectually, morally and religiously convcrtcd,canbringthat
tradition back on course, and have a good chance of communicating with those outside the tradition.
Outsiders so converted have a good chance ofundcrstallding the insider's point of view." Sullivan,
"Lonergatl,ConversionandQbjectivity,"351
II Peter Monelle, "Conversion and the Constitutive Functioo of Grace," Science ef Espri144, Il(l.l (January-
April 1992):80.
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Lonergan acknowledges that human knowledge will be forever incomplete, but
then argues that its nature is nevertheless to seek authenticity to the best of its abilities.
Authenticity, he says, is gained through conversion and self-transcendence. Authenticity
moves us beyond self-interest. Conversion is one stcp in the process of ovcrcoming those
obstacles to authenticity.
2. Religious Conversion and Love
Though authenticity may be gained through development and progress, it is not
enough to speak of conversion simply as change, but rather as change for the better,
according to certain opcrational norms. $0 it is that one also cannot merely speak
broadly of change, but rather of three specific types ofdevclopments: intellectual, moral,
and religious. Human beings, by the very structure of their consciousness, are both
capable of, and oriented to, self-transcendence.l~ All three forms of conversion are what
Lonergan calls modalities of self-transcendence: intellectual conversion is a cognitive
self-transcendence; moral conversion is transcendcnce beyond one's own satisfactions;
religious conversion is a total self-transcendencc into a bcing-in_love. 1s lfthc
I'Sauer,247.
II Lonergan, Method!n Theology. 241. See abo Lonergan, ""Theology in its New Context." 18-19.
Although Lonergan deals in depth with lhe nature of conversion, other writers suggest spe<:ific ways that
convrnionsacluallyoo:cur. Jolnt'lloneempllasizesencounlerswilhothcrpeopJe,eitherpersonallyor
through read works, or by oral anecdotes. He also explores the ways in which obstaclcs to communication
may distort a cODversion e:'tperience, noting, ''lhc possibilitics ofchllngc are depcndent upon lhe adequacy
of communication." Johnslone, '11Je Experience ofConver.iion and the Foundations of Moral Theology,"
188. He further emphasizes narrative as being an important fonnof communication that could lead 10
conversion. His interpretation seel11li to echo Thomas Berry's o....n foo:us on the importance of narrative in
grounding cnvironmental W<.lrldviews; how convcrsion narrativcs and envirot1UlCntal narratives relate may
merit further cxploration. See Tholl1&> Berty, The Dream of/he: Earth (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
1988), and Anne Marie Dalton, A Theology for the Earth: The COlltrihll/iQlls of TIromas Beny alld Bernard
wtlergalI, Religions and Belicfs Series, no. 10. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1999)
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unrestricted desire to know grounds intellectual conversion, and the experience of
unbiased, "authentic" concern grounds moral conversion, it is the unrestricted being in
love which grounds religious conversion. And, while questions for intelligence, for
reflection, and for deliberation, may reveal the self.transccnding eros of the human spirit,
the fulfilment of that capacity to sci f-transcend occurs in the existential subject
transfonncd by love. 16 Although the teon "love" has setved many purposes in everyday
usc, Lonergan sct out to reclaim the transcendence behind love in terms of religious
conversion: "Religious conver.>ion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-
worldly falling in love. It is total and pennanent sclf·surrender without conditions,
qualifications, resetvations.,,17 It is not only to be in love but to be in love with the
transcendent
To be in love without qualifications or conditions or reservations or limits
is to be in love with someone transcendent. When someone lranscendent
is my beloved, he [sic] is in my heart, real to me from within me. When
that love is the fulfilment of my unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence
through intelligence and truth and responsibility, the one that fulfils that
thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth, goodness. Since he chooses
to come to me by a gift of love for him, he himself must be love. Since
loving him is my transcending myself: it also is a denial of the self to be
transcended. Since loving him means loving attention to him, it is prayer,
meditation, contemplation. Since love of him is fruitful, it overflows into
love of all those that he loves or might love. Finally, from an experience
of love focused on mystery there wells forth a longing for knowledge,
while love itself is a longing for union; so for the lover of the unknown
beloved the concept of bliss is knowledge of him and union with him,
however that may be achieved. ls
16 Lonergan, 'Theology in its New Contell.t,'· t9.
11 Lonergan, Method i" Theology, 240. See note 2, Chapter Four, for a funber discussion of Lollergan's
use of the term "love."
II Ibid., 109. For Lonergan, the object oftranscelldent love is GOO; however, Lonergan's philosophy,
influenced by Heiler, recognizes the common transcendent orientation of world religions.
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Lonergan believed that loving in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfilment of
our capacity for self-transcendence. 1'1 In this account of religious conversion, Lonergan
also covers the intellectual and moral implications: by being in love without restriction
one also longs for authentic value and authentic knowledge. Despite this, being in love is
neither a product of our knowledge nor something which we choose; one does not reason
oneself into being in love.20 Love is meant to alter the pursuit of knowledge because one
who loves wiU be more open to living by the transcendental precepts in the daily business
of making decisions.
Religious loving is ''without conditions, qualifications, reservations; il is with all
one's heart and all one's soul and all one's mind and an one's strength." Yet, although
this limitlessness may seem to parallel our capacity for unrestricted questioning,
unrestricted loving "does not pertain to this world.,,21 As human beings we may be able
to question without restriction, but it is much more difficult, ifnot impossible, for a
human being to love without restriction. This is why, as a Christian philosopher,
Lonergan saw the need to be oriented to the transcendent mystery he knew as God; the
fullest expression of love must be other-worldly. Religious conversion is the expansion
of one's personal horizon from a focus on the finite world to the inclusion of the infmite,
of matters of ultimate meaning and transcendent mystery.22 For Lonergan, transcendent
'9 Jbid.,106
W 1bid.,123.
l'lbid.,242.
11 Sauer, 245.
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meaning completes finite meaning: although we are finite, we find completion in an
orientation to the infinitc.23
3. The Dynamics of Conversion
There has been some discussion among scholars as to how exactly the three types
of conversion relate to each other.24 Lonergan discusses the relationship between the
three in tenns ofsublation: 25
...what sublales goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new
and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering
wim the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it,
preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to
a fuller realization within a richer conteXl.26
In this case, moral conversion sublates intellectual conversion, a.nd religious conversion
sublates both moral and intellectual conversions. Despite the fact that he describes moral
conversion as going beyond intellectual conversion, and religious conversion as going
beyond moral conversion, Lonergan also asserts that "[i]n no way are the fruits of
intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished" in being transcended by religious
13 Ibid., 246.
z.l See Marsh, "Praxis and Uttimate Reatity,~ 225, and Johnstone, "The Elfperience ofConversioD and the
FoundatiolLS ofMoraJ Theology," 199-200.
13 Sauer notes that "sublation·· was a lerm invented by Hegel 10 describe a higberideatakingupalower
one. Lonergan·s use orthe term is slightly different, according 10 Sauer, meaning thai it goes "beyond
whal has \>e(:n acbieved by tbe addition of something new without tbe loss of wbat "'"lIS taken up." Sauer
247. Conn is not completely convinced of tile 5ublating rl:lationship betweentbe three, finding difficulties
with Lonergan's position. Ile elfplains his resCTralions in "Bernard Lonergan's Analysis orConversion,~
391~392. Similarly, Johnstone has questions on the causal sequencc between the tbrec. Ile agrees tbatlhe
process is not linear and proposes instead a spiral ofMdecpening religious transronnation~whicb Mdraw[sJ
forlh a deepening moral and dcepn1ing intcllcctualconversion." See Johnstone, "ThcElfper;enccof
Con~·ersionand the Foundations or Moral Theotogy,~ t99-200.
2<1 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 241.
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conversion.27 Lonergan argues that love actually does away with our old horizons and
establishes new ones so that both knowing and valuing are transformed.28
However this is not to say that intellectual conversion forms the base on which the
othcrs rest. From a Christian standpoint, there is first the gift of God's love. Love
rcveals values and provides the strength to adopt those values. In those values are
revealed the merits of believing truths taught by religious tradition and from this belief
springs the opportunity for intellectual conversion?~
The relationship between the types of conversion is further complicated by the
fact that partial conversions also may occur. The process is not linear: as Sauer notes,
"one tends to go through the three conversions incompletely and simultaneously.")()
From our earlier discussion of bias and decline it is clear that such transformations of
human beings struggling with ultimate meaning and transcendent mysteries tend to make
up a story of "fragmentary triumphs in the midst of brokenness, partial success and
failure.,,31 Such mixed results is the nature of the human condition. As we have
discussed, there are stumbling blocks 10 human development. If the state of being in love
is the highest expression of self-transcendence, Lonergan acknowledges that "man's self-
transcendence is ever precarious." It is human nature to be caught between opposing
forces, always in tension between one pull and another, between nature and history,
authenticity and inauthenticity, understanding and misunderstanding, progress and
decline. Thus, "human authenticity [and thus self-transcendence] is never some pure and
17 Ibid.. 242.
"Tbid.,I06.
:!9 Jbid ,,243.
)(I Sauer 248.
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serene and secure possession.,,32 Conversions are rarely total and there are no fixed rules
of how they are caused or how they proceed.33
Lonergan says that being in love is a gift, which in a Christian context is a gift
from God.34 In tenus of environmental ethics, Cannody notes that religious conversion
means that "the world becomes more gratuitous...3~ The world around us then cannot be
taken for granted because "[t]he mystery of God, the love of God that has seized our
heart and restructured our consciousness, puts brackets around everything. Henceforth
everything has another dimension, a facet of non-necessity, a message that it is a gift."36
Lonergan and Cannody see the gift oflove as an eye-opening to the otber gifts around us,
notably the environment, its resources, its creatures, its cycles, its power, and its fragility.
Both claim that it takes love to really appreciate and understand Ihis.
While we may be conscious of being in love, this is not to say that we fully know
how or why. Because of this, says Lonergan, it is the experience of mystery; such
mystery evokes awe, and such awe is an experience of the holy,31 Walter further
elaborates on this in a non-Christian context: while Cluistians may consider the state of
being in love a gift of God's grace, parallel experiences for non-Christians would be
" Johnstone, '1'he Experirnce of Conversion and the Foundations of Moral Theology," 200.
11 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 110
l) Lonergan, "Theology in ils New Context," 13.
j. Yel even in a Christian context, Lonergan believed God's gift of love was transcultural: "For if this gift is
offered to all men, ifit is manifested more or less authentically in the many and diverse religions of
mankind, if it is apprehended in as many different manners as tbere arc different cultures, stin the gift itself
as distinel from ilS manifestations is lranscultura\... God's gift ofhis love is frce. It is 001 eondiliancd by
buman knowledge; rather it is the cause that leads man to seek knowledge of God. It is not restricted to an)'
stage or sectiOll of human culture bUI rather is theprineiple that introdueed a dimensionofothCTWOrldliness
into any culture," MetJwdill Theology, 238
31 John Carmody, Ecology ond Religion: Toward a New Chrirlian Theology a/Nature (New York: Paulisl
Press,19B3),7\.
'*lbid.
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characterized by joy, self-giving friendship, and moments of undeserved benefaction.38
Conn adds that:
A philosophical, humanist ethic may not wish to presuppose God and his
love, but ifit is to be authentically open it must be ready to recognize that
the self-transcending love of man has no necessary limits. Indeed, insofar
as a religious outlook may be specified by its recognition and acceptance
of life as a gift, even themosl circumscribed love of man, if it be genuine
self-surrender, can be considered as the beginning of religious
conversion.39
Generally speaking, the fullest expression of conversion, that which Lonergan tenns
"religious conversion," pertains 10 the subject who no longer understands the world just
as it relales 10 oneself, but rather as things relate to each other; being in love is the highest
human expression of self-transcendence where the individual is no longer at the centre of
his or her universe. In this sense, one need not be religiously affiliated 10 accept Ihis
notion of religious conversion.
In the same way, Lonergan's general stance on the characteristics and
embodiments of love is meant to apply to the entire human race: "once [love] has
blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow
one's desires and fears, one'sjoys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's
decisions and decds.'o4O Love is evident in attitudes of "joy, peace, patience, kindness,
Jl Lonergan, Mc/hodin Theology, 106.
'" Walter, "The Foundations of Christian Moral Ellperience," 176. Lonergan belie\o'ed that if feelings help
discem value, lhe ultimate expression of feeling experienced in love discerns ultimale valucs, or religious
values. In !be Christian conlext, religious conversion eocompasses the virtues ofbope and charily, which
some have taken to mean a preference for the poor and disadvamaged, such as is extolled by proponents of
hberalion theology and solidarity. On libe1'1ltion theology, sec Walter 181; on solidarity, see Monette,
"Conversion and the Constitutive Function ofGnlce," 82. See also Robert Doran. Theology ond the
D;ol«/;o ojHislory (ToronIO: University ofToronto Press, 1990)
:19 Conn, '·Bernard Lonergan's Analysis of Conversion:' 389.
oIG Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology, lOS.
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goodness, fidelity. gentleness, and self_control.,04J Yel inherent in the power oflove is
also the acceptance of suffering or sacri fice. 42 Religious conversion, and indeed any
other conversion, is momentous and a monumental process; Lonergan does not hesitate to
acknowledge that "the adjustments it calls for may be both large and numerous:,.4) It is a
commitment not just to recognize values or make decisions based on values, but to
concretely live by those values, over the long term. and against major obstacles; it is
finding consonance between knowledge. value, and most importantly, action.44 So it is
that though the love of religious conversion be a self-surrender, it is done without loss of
theself. 45
4, The Contribution of Conversion
Conversion is a notion that is instrumental in coming to an understanding of
religion and, as we shall see, of religion's influence on environmental ethics. Conversion
is based on degrees of differentiated consciousness (that is, of how conscious we are of
the structure of knowing in its various realms and how easily we move between the
differentiations), on the notion of horizon, and on our capacity for self-transcendence. To
raise questions of ultimate meaning both lies within our horizon and may be satisfied,
though never fully, depending on the degree of differentiated consciousness. Conversion,
repeated at various stages ofconsciousness, allows for a progressive understanding both
"Ibid.,266.
"Ibid., 242.
"Ibid., 123
.. Walter Conn, 'Passionate Conunitment: The Dynamics of Aff~ctiveConvCf5ion," Cross Currents (Fall
t984):330.
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of religion as an institution (on the levcl of both a critical and appreciative appraisal) and
as an orientation.46 Sullivan summarizes:
By embracing more and more closely the transcendental precepts, be
attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, one is enabled to
develop a more highly differentiated consciousness and so widen one's
horizon so thai one approaches ever more near to the understanding of the
transcendent. Adhering to those transcendental precepts will involve
intellectual, moral and religious conversion.47
Furthermore, ''(ilt is important to stress that the commitment thai results from these
conversions leads not to a closed stale, but one of increasing openness ~ to truth, to
values, to reality as the utterly transcendent which communicates itself to us and is the
source and ground for our own self-transcendence.'>48 Taking a page from Heiler's
exposition on the seven shared features of world religions, Lonergan believed that such
has been the aim of any religious tradition, and more generally, of any religious
orientation. Lonergan considered religion to be a matter of conversion "in its
preparation, in its occurrence, in its development, in its consequents, and also, alas, in its
incompleteness, its failures, its breakdo\Vlls, its disintegration:..l9 Religion is an
expression oflhe process of conversion, a framework from within which (but also in
some cases, beyond which) one explores questions of ultimate meaning and value.
Following Heiler, the type of unrestricted loving integral to Lonergan's notion of
religious conversion is one of the seven shared features of world religions. Recognizing
unrestricted loving as a foundation for such a large part of the human population at least
" According to Sauer. the "self' is transformed by religious conversion, but is oot lost. Sauer, 245. The
issucofselfiotermsofconversiooisinitselfworthyofafullertreatrnetltbeyooothe scopc of this lhesis .
.. Sullivan. "Lolll'rgan, Conversion and Objcclivity,~ 348.
'1 Ibid.
'I Ibid.• 349-350.
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raises the possibility for cross-cultural dialogue. Furthennore, because religions are
composed of communities ofbclievers, the social implications of conversion arise
again.50 Sullivan argues in favour of Uinergan 's attempt to make conversion the centre
of religious study because it facilitates a concentration "on the dynamic, personal, and
concrete, rather than on the static, impersonal, and abstract" that he sees to dominate
traditional theology,51
But why bother knowing about religious conversion for ethics? Conn says that the
only truly effective moral consciousness is one that is opcn to the reality oflove and
transfonned by love's power, that is, the religiously converted consciousness.52 The
point is to make it a habit in one's life; according to Rende,lhe state of being in love is
the "habitual actuation of one's capacity for self-transcendence,,,5l Uive will infoon
decision-making, The already inherent desire for knowledge and value is enhanced and
amplified by love, which lcaves the subject open 10 a "richer context" in which to pursue
"Lonergan, Ml11rologyinitsNewConteltt,"14.
~ The ideas of Marsh, who takes a decidedly political focus on the issue of conversion, may be used as an
CJUlmple oftlle possible weial implications of conversion: "llI1ellectual conversion is useful to the elt!ent
that it arms one against positivism, scientism, reductionism, and technocracy. MoraJ conversion is nseful in
order to prevenl a 'c)1licism about means,' a playing fast and loose with democracy, freedom, equality, and
individual rights. Religious conversion is useful in th.at it prevents a fetishizing ordivini:dngofthe
political party or state in a way lhat short-circuits meaningful reform or revolution." Marsh, MPraltis and
UltimateReality,"238
" Sullivan, "Lonergan, Conversion and Obj~tivity," 350
II Conn, '·Bernard Lancrgan·s Analysis of Conversion,'· 390. Conn uses the terms "affectively converted
consciousness" and "affective conversion." Affective conversion is a term Lonergan used in his later
works, as found in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," t 79. It seems to correlate to his notion of
religious conversion, allhough there is some debale about this. 00 aIT~tiveconversion, see Conn,
"Affective Conversion: The Transformation of Desire,"in Religion and Culture; Conn, "Passionate
Conurutment: The Dynamics of Affective Conversion," Walter, 'The Foundations of Christian Moral
ElrpCrience," and Bernard J. Tyrell, "Affective Conversion: A New Way of Feeling," in The Human
Experience a/Conversion, Proceedings of the Theology Institute of Villanova University, volume 19
(Villanova, PA: Villanova Unh'ersity Press, 1987). DoI'1lIl suggests thaI there is a fourth type of
conversion, which he terms "psychic conversion," in relating Lonergan's work 10 depth psychology. See
Roben Doran, Theology and Ihe Dialectics o/Hislory (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990).
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knowledge and value without fear: "One frees oneself from the unauthentic. One grows
in authenticity. Harmful. dangerous. misleading satisfactions are dropped. Fears of
discomfort, pain. privation have less power to deflect one from one's course. Values are
apprehended where before they were overlooked."j4 Miller argues that conversion is
essential to any truthful inquiry, regardless of whether the inquirer is consciously
religious or not. He notes umergan's contention that conversion determines authenticity
and that religious conversion in particular is fundamental to authentic self-transcendence.
Because authenticity commands not only truthful intellectual inquiry but also moral
deliberation. and because any inquiry is a form of self-transcendence. Lonergan believed
the notion of conversion to be relevant oUlside theology and religion.55
5. Lonergan's Notion oftbe Human Good
Conversion is particularly important to Lonergan's notion of the human good.
Here, theology and ethlcs are intertwined. In Lonergan's philosophy, having a notion of
the human good is essential to sustaining a theology which mediates between religion and
llRellde, 162.
S< l.onergan, Method in Theology, 52.
II Edward J. Miller. "Newman 011 Conscience and umergan on Conversion: The Shadow ofPbto," in
Criticaf Essays on John Henry Newman. ed. Ed Block, Jr., ELS MOllogr.lph Series, No 55 (Victoria, B.C.:
English Literary Studies, University of Victoria, 1992). t 12. As an example of the r..levance ofeonversion
beyond theology, James Marsh's analysis of the opposition between the values l'mbraced in religious
conversion and those found in capitalism open up a discussion on /Tee market environmen1.lllism Marsh
argues that capitalisrn, with itsQTientation to the useful,has IIO use fortbe "contemplative attentiveness" of
religious conversion: "From the perspcctiv~ ofreligious conversion, the most valuable tbings in human life
- thought, an, fri~nd.ship, live, contemplation - are 'useless' in this sense [Le. the dominance of
capitalism's instrumental r~as.onJ. This perv~rsiOll and absurdity lies in its subordinating tbe esscntialto
theacciden1.lll,the 'useless' to theuseful,thc intrinsically valuable to the inslrUntentally v3luable. 11Iat
which should be highest becomes lowest and the lowest highest; that which should he the means becomes
the end and the end becomes tbe means {Lonergan, 1972, pp, 101-109)." Marsh, "Praxis and Ultimate
Realil)',"237.
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its cultural matrix.S6 Values arc apprehended through feelings and affinned in judgments
at the fourth level of conscious intentionality, deliberation; this is the realm of ethics. It
is more than just judgment of fact, a distinction thoroughly explored in Insight.
Judgments offact are intertwined with, and integral to, arriving at judgments of value,
but ethics can never lose sight of preserving action as its final goal. Establishing and
ordering values according to a notion of the human good enables individuals to identify
their priorities in their personal lives and for communities to identify their common good.
Community-minded interest groups, both religious and secular, argue that the "intense
individualism" attributed to today's North American society thus does not represent the
fuJI picture of community interaction.s7 Those who support the principles of
contemporary individualism appeal to the importance offrcedom.s~ While freedom is an
essential part of being human, Lonergan shows in Method in Theology that "[l]iberty is
exercised within a matrix ofpersonaI rclations.',s9 That is, an individual experiences true
freedom only within the context of community. Thus Lonergan's notion ofthc human
good takes into account not only the individual but also the social realm. If an account of
the human good is to include the social, it must pay attention to the ordering of that
society. It is then no surprise that the human good emphasizes the good of order - the
"concrete functioning of human cooperation to bring about a sustained succession of
particular goods" - and the importance of community.60 In practical tenns as a condition
of human freedom, this means that the human good concerns itself with the ordering of
S6 Lonergan, MelhrnJi" The%gy,xi .
.l1S<:eSomerville,5.S.
"Ibid
"Lonergan, Method in Theology. 50.
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economies, government, legal systems, education, the family unit, churches, and ali other
organizations which bring order to human interaction. It is not hard to imagine how each
of these influences our relationship with the environment and how the values of one may
potentially conflict with what is best for the environment and with the values of other
social systems.
The human good includes skills, feelings, values, beliefs, cooperation, progress,
and decline.61 Of particular note for this thesis is the emphasis on belief and cooperation.
The ordering of society, with the goals of this ordering reflected in the structure of the
good, is built around patterns of cooperation. Human beings as a species have certain
ways of solving problems and meeting needs and it is taken for granted that most of us
accomplish this through some level of cooperation and belief. A notion of the good itself
will not guarantee proper action but rather points in the right direction and so facilitates
solutions. So too do the transcendental precepts outlined in Lonergan's cognitional
theory. They only guide knowing and doing; they do not guarantee a proper outcome but
can only increase the probability of favourable results. Similarly, conversion selVes to
orient, not dictate, proper ways to live. The structure of the good, of knowing, and of the
process of conversion is dynamic and cyclical, which is a recurring theme in Lonergan's
writing.62
60 Ibid.• 50.
• , Ibid., 27; for a more deuiled description of the human good, see Me/hod in Theology, chapter twlJ,
espcciallypage48.
62 umergan's prevailing philosophy and methods are mainly beuristic rather than dogmatic, as is seen
explicitly in chapter 18 of fnsighr, entitled, 'The Possibility of litbics" where he SUtes that "our concern is
001 to draw up a code ofelhics bUlrather 10 mecl the relc"anl prior queslions."618
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Sullivan warns that we must be careful of reading too much into umergan's use
of the term "conversion." There are three traps to avoid. First, "[tJhe conversions spoken
of do not guarantee intellectual infallibility, moral perfection or spiritual sanctity."
Conversions, being dynamic states, are frequently incomplete or precarious to maintain,
Sullivan argues that we not take Lonergan's notion of conversion to be a resting-place,
but rather a new vantage point towards a horizon which we constantly strive to
transcend.63 Second, he notes that we should not become preoccupied with the ordering
arrangement of how conversions occur. Acknowledging what he considers to bc some
obscurity and ambiguity in Lonergan's explanation of the relationships between the types
of conversion, Sullivan points oUlthat what is most important is the necessity that the
conversions take place at all. Each is necessary, each provides a context for the others,
and each reinforces the contributions of the othcrs.64 Third, Sullivan argues that
conversion cannot be understood simply as a Christian concept or as occurring only in a
Christian context. Despite Lonergan's "committed denominational viewpoint," Iris work
can be used by Christians and non-Christians alike; Sullivan asserts that "Lonergan is
using the concept of conversion as a way ofreaclring the sources of disagreement and
misunderstanding amid our pluralistic situation.'.65 By identifying our capacity for
conversion as rooted in human nature (the supposedly invariant structure of knowing, and
the universality of wonder, concern, value, and questions of ultimate meaning) Lonergan
attempts to bridge cultural and historical gaps with his method and philosophy.
6JSulli,·an,"umergan,ConvcrsionandObje<;;tivity,"3S0.
6<SU1liVRn, "LQnergan,Conversion,andObjectivity,"3S0
~Ibid.• 3SI.
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Implicit in Lonergan's transcultural applicability is its social relevance. In writing
about conversion and the human good, Lonergan strove to emphasize the concrete nature
of his argument; the opening sentence of the chapter on the human good in Method in
Theology states bluntly: "What is good, always is concrctc.'.66 The good is intimately
tied to social values and the social structure, among other things, and as was discussed
previously, aiming for and achieving the good depends largely on cooperation. When
speaking of social organizations, Lonergan points out that "[tJhe family, the state, the
law, the economy, are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing
circumstance[.j'.67 Changing circumstances encompass things such as developments in
ideas, concepts, judgments, evaluation, orders and requests. lIS lfconversion is also about
development, it would seem reasonable to conclude that developments in community
organization and values would follow or should follow conversions at an individuallevei,
as the community would then consist of converted individuals. Indeed, Sullivan argues
that conversion "results in a focusing on the individual within a believing community.'.6'1
Traditional theology tended to focus motC on the universal, the abstract, the static, and a
Platonically-inspired notion ofan unchanging good. By contrast, Lonergan's notion of
conversion focuses on the lives of individuals who are forever changing and developing,
shifting the emphasis onto the dynamism of both individual and oommunity.11l A
community made up of converted or converting individuals cannot help but experiencc
66lo~rgau, Me/hod in Theology, 27.
67 "Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness: 170.
"lbid.,J70
... Sullivan, "Lonergan, Conversion and Objcctivity: 350
wIbid.
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change itself, on all levels of organization, and so conversion becomes an issue of social
concem as well.
Lonergan asserts that the results of conversion are worth the sacrifices and
struggles and indeed seem necessary to living an authentic life and doing authentic work.
Conversion is a pivotal notion in Lonergan's theory of functional specialization, a theory
which relates divisions ofwork.71 Lonergan argues that only through conversion,
particularly intellectual and moral self-transcendence, can a person not only resolve one's
own conflicts but also cast a critical eye on the work of others to discern ambivalence and
appreciate achievement.72 Through conversion one is able to rise above group bias,
recognizing the shortcomings of one's allies and the strengths of one's opponents. In the
context of environmental ethics, this means that one cannot become caught up solely in
the interests of one's own group; it is an openness to all sides of the story in an effort 10
work towards a common good.
6. Progress
Our earlier discussion of bias and cvillcd into the ways that conversion may
offset decline. With conversion to combat decline, it opens the way for authentic
progress, which is a goal of any study of ethics. Progress also has a cyclical structure.
Lonergan says:
7' Funclional specialization is an eightfold division of work, as laid oot in Method in Theology. l.oncrgan
believed his o....n discipline of theology could be bener organized in a "framework for creative
collaboration" (MelhodinTheology,xi). Thedivisionisalongthclincsofeightdistincltasks:rescarch,
interpretation. history, dialcctics, foundations. doctrines, systematici, and communications. Lonergan's
ootionoffunctional specialties is now gaioing more attentionootside theology.beingconsideredacross
diverse disciplines rromeconomics to rcligioos studies 10 law
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Growth, progress, is a matter of situations yielding insights, insights
yielding policies and projects, policies and projects transfonning the initial
situation, and the transfonned situation giving rise to further insights thai
correct and complement the deficiencies of previous insights. So the
wheel of progress moves forward through the successive transfonnations
of an initial situation in which are gathered coherently and cumulatively
all the insights that occurred along the way.n
In this one description of progress, Lonergan's cognitional theory is intertwined with his
penchant for identifying patterns and cycles, which all add up to a heuristic method
applicable to ethics: data is provided through experience of situations, questions are
asked in an effort to yield insight to ultimately understand the situation, judgments are
made in Ihe fonn of policy adoption, and deliberations are enforced through action,
which then leads to further insights and situations that will serve as new data for the
whole process to begin again. This is the structure of decision-making. Progress is then
the result of authenticity in knowing and doing. Knowing the elements which may lead
to progress and how those elements relate on both an individual and community scale
gives us a general framework through which to sort OUI particular situations. Knowing
what progress is, what decline is, and how the two relate, gives us a basis for figuring out
how collective responsibility can occur. Progress in environmental ethics includes an
analysis ofcolleclive responsibility. Collective responsibility occurs as a result of
conversion on a community level. Progress is seen to be cumulative development, a
continuous flow of improvement, through the sustained observance of the tmnscendental
preceptS.74
:n Lonergan, Me/hod in Theology, 252.
7l umergao, "Healiog aoo Creating in History: in A Third Collectioll, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York:
PauliSIPress, 1985), 105
74 Loncrgan, Melhodin Theo!ogy, 53.
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If the good is concrete, so are instances of authentic progress:
Being attentive includes attention to human affairs. Being intelligent
includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities. Being
reasonable includes the rejection of what probably would not work but
also the acknowledgment of what probably would. Being responsible
includes basing one's decisions and choices on an unbiased evaluation of
short-tenn and long-tenn costs and benefits to oneself, to one's group, to
othergroups.75
This description highlights the concrete guidelines ofprogrcss while respecting
tbe necessary generality of an empirical method.
In any ethical decision the possibility of evil and unintelligibility must be
accounted for. Lonergan argues that it is religious values which combat evil. Religious
values, in the spirit of a binding together oriented to ultimate meaning, arc meant to foster
cooperation, which is the crux of human development. Human beings progress through
cooperation, as Lonergan explains in his conception of the human good. Evil and the
unintelligible are overcome by the healing capacities of love, which, by revealing values,
transfonns both the individual and the community. Thus, only religious values can
adequately combat evil: '\vhile secularism has succeedcd in making religion a marginal
factor in human affairs, it has not succeeded in inventing a vaccine or providing some
other antidote for hatred.,,76 The component of action, in both Lonergan's own
philosophy and in ethics in general, is essential. He asserts that "it is not enough to
remove mistaken beliefs and to rcfonn the mistaken believer. One has to replace as well
as remove, to build up as well as tear down. Mere hunting for errors can leave one a
'1 Ibid.
lOLonergan, 'Heating and CTealing in HiSIQ')"," 106-107
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personal and cultural wreck without convictions and commitmcnts."n Thus it is not
enough to stand by and criticize. One must take part in both healing and creating in order
for progress to occur. Lonergan's thought offers the tools with which to do it, and the
signposts to guide the way. Included in these signposts are his three forms of conversion.
Intellectual conversion will guide our quest for knowledge, for facts, for truth. Moral
conversion will guide our deliberation in light of the facts. Religious conversion offers
the virtues of prudence, temperance, justice, courage, faith, hope, and charity, sustaining
virtuous action in the midst of biases.
7. Summary
As we have seen, Lonergan believed that progress and authentic human
development, on both all individual and collective scale, are effected through the method
of self-transcendence or self-appropriation, and through a triad of conversions.
Intellectual conversion means dispelling the myth that knowing is taking a look. Moral
conversion means values are chosen over personal satisfactions when the two conflict.
Religious conversion means loving in an unrestricted manner. All three are inextricably
linked and furthermore may apply outside the context of organized religion. They are
particularly important in Lonergan's notion of the human good which is to a large extent
oriented around social structures. Making decisions around how we collectively organize
ourselves is fundamental to ethics and so the human good and conversion have
significant social and ethical implications Depending on what is valued in the social
n Lonergan, Me/had in Theology, 44.
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order and how social policies are made, we are constantly walking the balance between
collective progress or decline. The transcendental precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be
reasonable. and be responsible, which correspond to the diffcrentlcve1s of consciousness
in Lonergan's cognitional theory, serve as norms by which to determine our authenticity
and to determine the degree to which we need conversion. Although Lonergan makes
distinct the notions ofknowing, doing, the human good, and conversion, in application
these components of his philosophy interlock. All are dynamic and cyclical and all
contribute to authentic living. All offer opportunities for praxis; they do not foretell
outcomes but rather offcr structures oriented towards propcr conduct.
We move now to an examination of environmental ethics from a Roman Catholic
perspective, or rather, several perspectives, since there is considerable variance of
viewpoints within this denomination regarding the relationship between human beings
and their environment. Environmental ethics is very much about social policies and
social organization and the values inherent in our collective social dealings. While this
may be so, there are those who believe religion has a contribution to make to the
environmental debate, especially in tenns of offering normative guidelines for behaviour
and foundations for asking questions of ultimate meaning, the answers to which
potentially influence how we relate to our surroundings. The question of what
Lonergan's notion of conversion may contribute will be addressed with an eye towards
arguing for the social relevance of religions such as Roman Catholicism in the
environmental debate and identifying common ground on which to facilitate dialogue
between religious and secular views of the environmental crisis.
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Cbapter Four: Catholic Perspectives on Environmental Ethics
and tbe Contribution of Bernard Lonergan
Roman Catholicism may be used as a Christian example ofa religious approach
10 environmental ethics. As stated in the introduction, overt Christian concern for the
environment is a relativcly recent tum of events. Because of this, ecotheology is still in
its early stages. This chapter will explore the history of environmental concern within
Catholicism and discuss some general themes which occur in Catholic writing on the
environment. Such themes include anthropocentrism, stewardship, solidarity with the
poor, economic development, and collective responsibility. The second part of the
chapter will include an analysis of the potential contribution offered by Lonergan's
notion of conversion. A preliminary evaluation ofthc Catholic environmental
perspectives in the context of Lonergan's philosophy will also be offered.
I. Is Love Enougb?
In the preface to her 2001 book, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and
Economyfor a Planet ill Peril, Sallie McFague pointed out a deficiency in her previous
book. McFague's previous work asserted the need for people to take a loving approach
towards the lending to and use of nature. In Life Abundant, McFague noted:
I realized love was not enough. I realized that we middle-class North
American Christians are destroying nature, not because we do not love it,
but because of the way we live: our ordinary, taken-far-granted high-
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consumer Iifestylc. I realized that thc mattcr ofloving nature was a deep,
complex, tricky question involving greed, indifference, and denial.!
McFague attempted to rectify what shc saw as the inadequacy of relying solely on love
with a call for action and change, particularly in economic terms; a call to live differently
in order to love nature. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Lonergan's notion of
religious conversion pivots around unrestricted love. On the surface one could dismiss
Ihis as yet anolher example oflhe "all you need is lovc" mentality which struck McFague
as inadequate. Indeed, popular conceptions of love often portray it as passive,
sentimental, or static. A reader introduced to Loncrgan may come with. this in mind and
thus be disappointed at this seemingly cliched answer. On closer inspection, however, it
is neither a cliche nor the final answer. As McFague says, love itself is a tricky question,
both oomplex and deep. 1flove is an answer, it serves primarily to orient us, to set a
framework in which to pursue other questions. Scholars havc examined Lonergan's
intention and use oflhe tenn "love" and describe it as action-oricnted, revealing
Lonergan's roots in both Aquinas and Aristotle.2 Harkcning back to Aristotelian
principles ofmovement and rest, the being-in-Iove of religious conversion satisfies both
demands: it is a dynamic state "that sublates aJl that goes before, a principlc of movement
I Sallie McFaguc:. LIfe Abundont: Rethinking Thf!Olog}' and £ronomy for a Planet in Peril, Minneapolis:
Fortress Press. 2001, xi. The book to which she refers is her t997 work entitled, Super, Natural Christiall!J
How We Should u:we Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997).
I Walter Conn particularly finds the nei:d to clarify the tenn "love," to set aside connotations of "falling-in-
love" as passive or scntimental; COIID stales that "[b]y 'love' Lonergan clearly means the acti\'e, other·
oriented principle ofbeneficence and benevolence." Conn, "Passionate Commitment: The Dynamics of
Affe<:tive Cooversion," 331, Conn then offers his own interpretation oflhe meaning ofloV(l: ".. .love is
passionate; it is not a bloodless act ofcerebral will. Second,asemotion,loveisnotblind,ithasacognitive
charactcr. Love is a passionate interpretation, judgment, dedsion, choice - unrdle<;tive and therefore
undifTerentiated(feeling, knowing, choosing are one). Third, though unrcflective, love can be influenced,
even transformed by reflection. Fourth, and perhaps most important, love, though a passionate desire, must
be distinguished clearly from possessive desire:' 335.
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at once purgative and illuminative" and also "a principle of rest in which union is
fulfilled.") Ifone were to combine this healing capacity of love with intellectual and
moral conversion and Lonergan's transcendental method, it might offer the possibility of
establishing common ground, a framework from which to discuss issues of environmental
ethics from a Catbolic perspective. After highlighting some of the major ecological
themes in contemporary Catholic thought, we will proceed into a discussion of how
Lonergan's thought might serve as an invitation to the discovery of the principles, nonns
and practice of authenticity in the context of environmental ethics. One might argue that
Lonergan's relevance lies in the gcnerality of his method; although he does elaim certain
noons and standards like the transcendental precepts to which onc must remain true, he
does not claim he has all the answers. Any approach that is based in Lonergan's thought
would not involve prescription, leaving the freedom and the responsibility of making
choices with the individual and groups. The franlcwork which Lonergan sets up can be
used as a guideline to counter relativist claims that there are no truths, yet it may offer
enough flexibility for individuals to discover authenticity on thcir own.
2. Catholic Penpcctives on tbe En\·lronmcnt
In the introduction to a collection of essays by Catholic writers concerning the
environmcnt, editor Michael Barnes notcs: "There is more than one pattern in the history
of Christian thought. It includes those who affirmed the eanh as well as those who
} Lonergan, "Nalural RighI and Historical Mindedness," 175
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denied it, those who loved and praised it as well as those who sought to escape from it.''''
It is this diversity ofvicws which serves to perplex anyone sifting through Catholic
perspectives on environmental ethics. Are there common threads of thought within the
tradition? If there are any unifying features, what does Catholic thought contribute to the
wider issue of environmental ethics? While some say Catholic thought has a long way to
go in adequately addressing the environment, those active in the movement to integrate
reLigious views with ecology are emphatic that organized religion, here specifically
Western Christianity, still has a relcvant role to play. Fred Kreuger, director afthe North
American Conference on Christianity and Ecology argues that:
[t]he undeveloped key to the environmental erisis... is to tap the power
inherent in the churches. No other body has the potential to fire the
conscience into renewed activity on behalf oCthe earth... As a people,
we've been commissioned 'to replenish the earth' (Gen. I:28). What
other justification or incentive do we need to bcgin?s
Although quoting the same biblical exhortation which Lynn White saw as proof of
Christianity's burden of guilt for environmental damage, Kreuger thinks there is at least
an obligation of responsibility upon the religion. Others are more specific about what the
Christian, and particularly Catholic, tradition has to offer. Evans says that "Catholic
social thought is not long on environmental statements, but its inclusion ofjustice issues
within those statements may be the greatest contribution the Church's social teaching can
• Michael H. Barnes, All Ecology ol,ke Spirl" Religious Reflectioll alld EllvlrQllmelllal
COlIsclouslless, The Annual Publication oflhe College Theology Society 1990, Volume 36 (Lallham, MD'
Univcrsity Pres~ of America, 1994),2
'Quoted in Diane E. Sherwood, "Ecology and the Church: Theology and AClion." Chri,rriall Celli"'/)'
(May 13, 1987): 472·474. hltpJlwww.religioll-online.orglcgi-binirelsearchd.dlllshowarticle?item_id""22t.
Accessed 16Scplember200t
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bring to contemporary environmental debates.'.6 Indeed, others have said that
contemporary Catholic social ethics cannot be considered complete unless they takc into
account environmental issues.7 It is this sense of responsibility for social leaching that
can tie into Lonergan's notion of conversion. Conversion is the call to change not only
on an individual level, but on a collective level.
To understand the context, we should first look at the documents produced by
various authorities in the Catholic Church which address environmental issues. These
would include papal encyclicals and documents produced from regional bishops'
conferences, In addition 10 articles by Catholic writers referring to the extent of the
Church's publications on the environment, one particular sociological study at the
University ofNotre Dame in 1999 undertook a survey to discover what, if any, scientific
constructs concerning the environment pervaded recent Catholic papal and episcopal
conference documents,S The objective was to establish areas of common ground, in the
shared concern of science and religion for understanding how human beings and the
environment relate, and to identify differences between scientific and religious
perspectives in the use of scientific conslructs such as "ecosystem," "population,"
"carrying capacity," and "holistic model," among other tenos. The study noted, among
its conclusions, that "[t]he main difference is the relative absence of two biological
• Bernard F. Evans, "God's Creation and the Christian's Response," in To Do Jus/ice and
Righi Upon Ihe Earth· Papers/rom Ihe V'rgil Michel Symposium on Lilurgy and Social Jusfke, cd. Mary
E. Stamps (Collegeville, MN, The Liturgical Press, 1993), 112
1 note 25, Christine Firef Hinze, "Catholic Social Teacbing and Ecological Ethics," in "And God Saw Thai
it Was Good"; Calholk Theology amllhe Environment, cd. Drew Christiansen and Walter Grazer
(Washington.. D.C.: United Stales Catholic Conference, (996), 180.
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constructs in the Catholic documents, carrying capacity and population, that may affect
possible convergence of scientific and religious environmental understanding.,,9
Relevant to the matter at hand, however, is the study's enumeration of Catholic
documents referring to the environment. These include four papal sources: the 1979
encyclical Redemptor Hominis, the 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, the 1990
World Day of Peace Message entitled "The Ecological Crisis," and the 1991 encyclical
Centisimus Annus. Also included are the episcopal conference pastoral letters: "Our
Relationship with Nature" (1987, Dominican Republic), "What is Happening to Our
Beautiful Land" (1988, Philippines), "Ecology" (1988, Lombardy, Northern Italy),
"Promotion of Underprivileged Development: To Respect and to Develop Environment"
(1989, Indonesia), "Companions in Creation" (1991, Florida, United States), and
''Renewing the Earth" (1991, United States). The authors do not include docwnents from
the Second Vatican Council nor the Catechism of the Catholic Church, as thcse did not
contain clear examples of the scientific constructs the study's authors wanted to code.
Interestingly, the authors say in a footnote that "in a preliminary coding of 'Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modem World' (Galldium et Spes), we found no
explicit mention of environmental constructs, and two brief and somewhat contradictory
evaluations of population issues.',lo Yet in Bernard 1. Pnewozny's summary oCtile
I Andrew Downs and Andrew Weigert, "Scientific and Religinus Convergence Toward an Environmental
Typology? A Search for Scientific Constructs in Papal and Episcopal Documents," Journal/or the
Scientific Studyo/Religion 38, no.l (1999): 45·58
9 lbid., 45.
10 Ibid., note 4, 56. Footnote 5 in the study states funher that "[tJhe Catechism of the Catholic Church in
part emphasizes that humans should respect the earth and serve as its stewards. These concepts are to guide
humans to make morally good decisions regarding the earth, although apparently in a way that benefits
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history around the Catholic Church and the environmental crisis, he comes to a different
conclUSion, citing the Pastoral Constitution as the Church's first acknowledgment ofan
ecological problem.!1 From this brief example it is evident that the extent of the
Church's published concern is open to interpretation. Whcn the contribution of Catholic
writers outside the Vatican is accounted for, the range of discussion opens up
considerably. Whilc there seem to be recurring themes in Catholic writing on the
environment, the stances on the issues and interpretations vary. Further, new areas of
Catholic philosophy introduced in creation spirituality, feminist theology, and liberation
theology make the debate even more lively. The scope of this thesis will not allow
detailed treatment of these latter areas of new ground, suffice it to say that they are
expressions of contemporary concerns which help further test and expand the bounds of
the tradition. 12 All have tackled the issues of environmental ethics, to varying degrees of
them over nonhuman creatures." 57. A discussion of the extent of the Church's anthropocentrism will
follow later in this chapter.
II PlUwOzny, "he Catholic Church and Ecological Concern," 54. Sec also his article, "Integrity of
Creation: A Missionary Imperative," SEDOS Sul/eo·n (Do::ember t5, 1988): 363-373. Further comparison
between the anicles reveals that while Downs, Weigen and Ptze"'"OZny agree on the papal documents
which make explicil reference to too environment, PlZe"'·ozny comments, without going into deTail, that
these are only examples of"numerous documents" in which "John Paul II took to heart humankind's need
10 improve ilS relation to the environment." Do"'1IS and Weigen imply in their study that tbey have
accounted foreverytbiog they consider relcvant in tenllS of scientific cnnstructs. Pr.:ewozoyalsocites
Pope Paul VI's 1971 Apostolic Leiter, Oclogesima Advenien,', as containing rele\'ant forceful stalements on
urbanization, an issue which did nol qualify as crileria under Down's and Weigen's scienlific comtruct
sNdy. In contrast, PrzewoznYl11.llkes only passing refercnce to the results of episcopal conferences,citing
specifically only the conference of the Dominican Republic, while Downs and Weigen consider the resullS
of five other bishops' conferences.
" For example, on feminiS! lheology, liberation theologian and priest Albeno Munera states, "In a
patriarchal and discriminative n:ligionlil::e Catholicism, we have to learn from feminist theology in which
we fmd a serious promotion ofjustice, a wise control ofpopulation gro",1h, an effective and balanced
domestic economic management especially in poor populations, arK! a sensitive ecology." M6.nera, "New
Theology on Population, Ecology, and O\"Crconsumption from the Catholic Perspective,'· in Visions ofa
Nf?W Earth: Religious Perspt'clives on Pop"larion. Consumprion, and Ecology, ed. Harold Coward and
Daniel C. Maguire (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2(00), 76. For olhcr Christian
feminist theology regarding the environment, see Mary lleather MacKinnon and Moni Mcintyre, eds.,
Rl!adings in Ecology olld Feminist Theology (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1995).
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commitment and success. This thesis will limit specific discussion primarily to the broad
and recurring themes in Catholic theology.
As a Western example of what issues are considered important in Catholic
dialogue on the environment, the Unitcd States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB) issued a statement in 200 I entitled, "Global Climate Cllangc: A Plea for
Dialogue, Prudence, and the Common Good," in which it identifies the following themes:
the universal common good; stewardship of God's creation and the right to economic
initiative and private property; protecting the environment for future generations;
population and authentic development; and caring for the poor and issues of equity.lJ An
earlier statement from the USCCB, entitled, Renewing the Earth, issued in 1991,
highlights many of the same themes and indicates that environmental ethics should take a
God-centred and sacramental view of the universe. I. Othcr themes arise in compilations
of Catholic writing, such as cultivating an ethics of limitation, restraint, and responsibility
in political, economic, and social choices, an emphasis on community, and compassion
for all living things. IS Writers reflecting on the Church's theology notc that the view of
creation and the environment is often sacramental, meaning that nature reveals and
affinns the presence, power, action, and grace of God. 16 French argues that "one of the
IJ United States ConfeTl:nce ofCatholic Bishops, "Global Climate Change: A Plea for Dialogue, Prudence,
and the Common Good," www.nccbllscc.orglsdwplintcmationalfl!\lobalclimat<:.htm. Accessed September
16,2001.
"Hinze, "Catholic Social Teaching and Ecological Ethics," 161-168; United States Episcopal Conference,
"Renewing the Earth," Origins 21 (December 12 1991): 425- 432; see also Kathleen Braden, "On Sa"ing
!he Wilderness: Wby Christian Stewardship is IIOt Sufficient," Christian Scholars Rf!VilN' 28, no. 2 (t998)
260.
I' Ryan, Challenge ofGlobal Stewardship, 6.
,. Drew Christiansen and Walter Grazer, eds., '"And God Saw That It Was Good .- Calholic The%gy and
the Environment (Washington, D.C.: Unilcd States Catholic Conference, 1996).
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key distinctive features of Catholic moral theology has been an affinnation that God's
reason and will may be discerned in the order of nature, in the naturallaw.,,17 Others
such as Rosemary Radford Ruether wish to make the view more covenantal, focusing on
pattcrns of right relations. 18
Whatever thc stance in Catholic writing, there is little doubt that social teaching
and social justice remain essential components. However, some scholars are concerned
that this may lead to excessive anthropocentrism. Evans notes, "[w]ith its focus upon the
dignity of the human person, any discussion of creation without references to the human
person has been difficult for Catholic social teaching.,,19 In tenns of the environmental
crisis, a perceived excessive anthropocemrism was a motivating factor in Lynn White's
thesis that Christianity bears a large burden of guilt for environmental degradation. There
is much discussion not only in Catholic circles but in a gcneral Christian context as to the
extent of anthropocentrism inherent in the religion. In his article, "The Integrity of
Creation: Catholic Social Teaching for an Ecological Age," Denis Edwards outlincs what
he sees to be four possible relationships belv.'cen human beings and other creatures:
exploitative anthropocentrism, conservationist anthropoccntrism, the intrinsic rights of
3; William French, "Contesting Energies: The Biosphere, Economic Surge, and the Ethics of Restraint," in
The Challenge ofGlobal Stewardship, 128.
'I Ibid.
II "In the cm·enantal tradition we find the basis fora moral relation to nature and to one another that
rnaDdates panerns of right relation, ell5hrining these right relations in law 115 the final guaranteeagainst
abuse. In the sacramental tradition we find tile hean, the ecstatic experience ofl and Thou, of interpersonal
communion, without which moral relationships grow beanless and spirilless. The i'lacramental view cao
become a mystical aestheticism without the covenantal tradition to give itagroundinginetbical
concreteness." Rosemary Radford Ruetber, "Theological Resources for funh-Hcaling: Covenant and
Sacrament," in The Challenge ofGlobal Stewardship, 55-56
'9 Evans, 'vod's Creation and the Christian's Response," III
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animals, and tbe intrinsic value oftbe whole ofcreation.20 In an anthropocentric view, all
other creatures are understood in terms of their worth to human beings, an interpretation
which emphasizes the instrumental value of creatures and natural things rather than their
intrinsic value. Edwards points out tbat anthropocentrism can work either to the
detriment of the environment or to its preseJVation: "It would be anthropocentric to argue
that hwnan beings should mine a national park because they have a right to make use of
natural resources. It would also be an anthropocentric argument to say that they ought
not mine a national park because future generations of human bcings havc a right to a
wilderness area.',21 As noted earlier, Christianity has been accused of being people-
oriented to the detriment of the environment. This is understood in some circles as
exploitative anthropocentrism which tries to justify ilselfin the biblical "subdue and
dominate" exhortation of Genesis. Edwards argues that this has been taken out of its
historical and literary context and simplistically applied to our modem context. He
claims that without this verse "[t]hcre are no proper biblical or theological grounds for
exploitative anthropocentrism."n For its part, the Catholic Church has never denied its
human-centred priorities; however, some of its defenders claim they arejuslified in this
ethic from an obligation to consider the consequences for their fellow human beings and
for the generations 10 come. This is excmplified in the statements issued by the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops. This reinforces Walter's statement that "the
:lG Denis Edwards, "The l.Dtegrity of Creation: Catholic Social Teaching for an Ecological Age," Pacifica 5
(1992):183.
" Ibid., 182. At the same time, exploitative anthropocrntrism is not exclusil'e to a religiOlls view, as
ethicist and animal rigbt advocate Peter Singer poin15 out in his examination of environmental ethics.
Singcr,273
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primary vaJue to whieh we are driven in our questions ofvalue and are drawn in moral
experience is the fundamental symbolic value ofpersons."n If this is so, what
implications does this have for environmental ethics? Such thinking is an example of the
second type ofhuman-environment relationship described by Edwards, a conservationist
anthropocentrism which values steWardship of the environment. Nature is conserved and
protected with intentions meant to be wise and responsible, but creatures and the
environment are still largely treated as objects. The third way of understanding the
relationship between human beings and other creatures is that ollen espoused in animal
rights philosophies. Animal rights activists usually champion the intrinsic worth and
right to life of animals, based on the fact that, like human beings, animals can feel pain
and thus their ethical interests have value equal to that of people. In explaining the fourth
type of relationship, Edwards cites Alben Schweitzcr's philosophy of"revcrence for life"
and ecologist Aldo Leopold's argument that ecological ethics rcsts on the sole premise
that an individual belongs to a community of interdepcndent parts.24 In this view the
integrity of the whole system is more important than the interests of single entities within
the system. Having laid out this variety of views, Edwards argues that Christian teaching
and theology actually go beyond anthropocentrism to include an ethics of intrinsic value.
He includes stewardship in this ethics, claiming that the notion of stewardship is not
intrinsically anthropocentric.
II Edwards, ''The Integrity ofCreation: Catholic Social Teaching for an Ecological Age," 184; Lynn White
Jr. would be one such ohjcctor.
l.1Walter,'1"heFoundationsofChristianMoral Experience," 179.
14 Edwards, '"loe llllcgrity of Creation: Catholic Social Teaching for an Ecological Age," 186.
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The adequacy of an anthropocentric view is still a point of contention between
Catholic thinkers. William French, writing on "Catholicism and tbe Common Good,"
lakes issue directly with Pope John PaullJ's 1991 World Day of Peace Message,
claiming Ihat the Pope's "anthropocentric interpretation of the common good restricts the
boundary of the moral community deserving ofdirect moral consideration to tbe class of
human persons.',25 French argues that an anthropocentric view does not challenge the
status quo, that being the moral tradition "which has for so long helped us enjoy easy
consciences even as we have proceeded to exploit, develop, and destroy many species
and CCQsystems of the biosphere,,,26 In this respect he docs not think Catholicism offers
the counlercuItural alternatives which religion often espouses. Edwards offers a different
interpretation of the Pope's view, While Catholic social teaching may emphasizc respect
for life and the dignity of human beings, Edwards asserts that "the Pope clearly goes
beyond an exclusively human-centred morality when he writes that the two guiding
principles for a peaceful society are respect for life and the integrity of crealion, This is a
fundamental shift beyond anlhropocentrism to a view that there is an intrinsic value to all
life systems, to the whole biosphere, and to all ofcreation.',27 However, another
interpretation, by John Cannady, takes issue with the Genesis exhortation, and what he
sees to be the Pope's support of the traditional reading of "subdue and dominate,"
Furthennore, regarding the Pope's third encyclical,1Aborem Exercens, Cannady
concludes that "the Pope almost makes forcing nature 10 productivity the measure of
21 William French, ''Catholicism and the Conunon Good oftbc Biosphere," in All Ecology ofthe Spirit
Religious Reflection and Environmental COrr.l'cioume)·s, The Annual Publication oftbc C<Jllege Theology
Society 1990, Volume: 36 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.), t87.
u lbid
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human grandeur. Very little in his encyclical defends nature, or us human beings who are
part and parcel of nature's ecosystems, from future pollution or despoJiation."28 That
even the Pope's direct statements on the environment would prompt such diverse
interpretations implies the ambiguous nature ofthe Church's commitment to
environmental ethics. Critics charge that the scarcity of explicitly environmental
statements is evidence of the Church's lack of concern. Defenders arguc thai the general
nature of the statements is meant to be inclusive. Where the apologists understand those
references to the environment to be allusive, critics see it as being elusive. This being
said, there are several recurring and overt themes which Catholic thought uses to discuss
matters of the environment.
Stewardship is a model offered up in many instances of Catholic environmental
ethics. It is particularly emphasized by the official voices in the Church hierarchy,
notably the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. The mandate of the USCCB
is to emphasize the "social mortgage" engraincd in the Catholic social justice tradition.
On this note the USCCB states that "[t]rue stewardship requires changes in human
actions" on both a moral and technological level, adding "(0]ur religious tradition has
always urged restraint and moderation in the use of material goodS."l9 While admitting
Ihat Catholic environmental ethics is still a work in progress. the USCCB seems to think
stewardship offers the best solution under the circumstances: "Stewardship implies that
we must both care for creation according to standards that are not ofour own making and
17 Edwards, "The Integrity ofCrcatiotl: Catholic Social Teaching for an Ecological Age," 193.
,. Carmody, 6
:!II USCCB website, www.nccbuscc.orglsd ....p/inleffiationallglobalclirnate.htm. Accessed September 16,
2001
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at the same time be resourceful in finding ways to make the earth flourish. It is a difficult
balance, requiring both a sense oflimils and a spirit ofexperimentation.'do In their
sociological survey of denominational differences within the United States' National
Religious Partnership for the Environment (NRPE), Mark Shibley and Jonathon Wiggins
voice reservations about the effectiveness of an ethics of stewardship. Shibley and
Wiggins claim that, if unaccompanied by a strong sense afeco-justice, an ethics of
stewardship will simply maintain the status quo: "stewardship fils with the traditional
conservation and preservation agenda of the environmental movement."]] Thus if the
situation calls for drastic change, stewardship may not be convincing enough 10 bring it
about. Matthew Fox, the driving force behind creation spirituality, does not support the
notion of stewardship on the basis of what he perceives 10 be its upholding of an inherent
hwnan mastery or superiority over the rest of creation. He argues that there is no room in
this ethic for wilderness, ofjust letting natural spaces exist without any human
contribution. Stewardship for Fox implies planning and management, the assumption of
a right 10 intervene on all of our surroundings which Fox sees to be highly presumptuous
on our part.]2 Despite its opponents, ste\vardship remains a popular notion in Catholic
environmental ethics because it imparts value to the natural environment while
maintaining a unique relationship between human beings and the rest of creation.
'" usec, Renewing the Face of the Earth: A Resource for Parishes. (Washington, D.C.: United States
Catholic Conference, 1994),5, as quoted in Mark A, Shibley and Jonathon L. Wiggins, 'The Greening of
Mainline American Religion: A S<x:iological Analysis of the Ellvironmental Elhics of the Nalional
Religious Partnership orlhe Environment," Social Compass 44, no, 3 (1997) : 339.
Jl lbid.,34S.
Jl Matthew Fox, '~rcationMySlicism and the Rctwn ora Trinilarian Christianity," ill An Ecology ofthe
Spiri/, 64-65. Sec also Fox's Coming ofthe Cosmic Christ: The Healing afMO/her Earth and the Birth ofa
Globa/Renaissance(San Francisco: HarpcrSanFrancisco, 1988).
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The notion of stewardship is linked to the notion of the common good. Being
stewards of creation means that it is a collective responsibility with collective benefits.
For some, the common good is quite specific, as in Carmody's position thaI the "good
life" in hannony with the well-being of the earth and its population will mean "material
sufficiency (but not luxury) and the preponderance of such spiritual pursuits as prayer,
education, medicine, art, pure science, and social services:']) Others prefer a more
general notion, as in the Church's adoption of the thought of Thomas Aquinas on natural
law.J4 Aquinas defined "law" primarily in Icons of the common good. According to
William French, Aquinas "situates analysis of the good of human communities explicitly
within affinnations about the broader common good, that of the community of creation."
It is the recovery of this notion of natura1law which could be beneficial to environmental
ethics. French goes on to add that "[r]ecovery of this tradition which finnly understands
that human society is a participant within a yet broader community should help Catholics
of all stripes begin to appreciate the creation-centred character of their own tradition."H
However, French qualifies his view of the adequacy of the common good. Like
stewardship, he does not see the common good as providing a strong enough challenge
against potentially exploitative anthropocentric values. There is still the problem of good
intentions going bad. If we make decisions collectively, we still may be blinded by the
group egoism which Lonergan warns against. However, as will be discussed shortly,
)J Cannody, 83.
3< French, "Contesting Energil'S,' 128·129
llIbid.
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Lonergan's notion of conversion may offer a potential way to create and to heal which
leads beyond bias into authenticity.
Another aspect of the common good in Catholicism is the notion of authentic
development. While environmentalists are often wary of references to development in
the context of ecological integrity, Christiansen explains that the Catholic notion of
authentic development "unlike reductionist concepts of economic growth, contains built-
in restraints and limits that help it readily cohere with an ecological reading of the
common good.'.36 Authentic development encourages moderation or limitation,
especially in consumption. Catholic thinkers argue thai there is a dual purpose of
moderation in tcnns of the economic split between "developed" and "developing"
nations: on the one hand, developing nations must realize that their goal is not to meet the
current, materialistic, lifestyle frequently found in developed countries, and on the other
hand, developed nations need to eurb their excesses by refusing to cling to the idea of
unlimited economic expansion and unrestricted eonswnption. The earth, with finite
resources, cannot support infinite growth envisioned by industrial nations, much less can
the whole world aim for the material standard of living to which we are accustomed in
the Western world. Authentic development is concerned both that poorer nations achieve
an adequate standard of living and that richer nations do not exploit the riches they
possess. The Church applies its call for moderation in the use of material resources to all
.. Q,ristian$en, "Ecology and the Common Good: Catholic Social T~aching and Envirornnental
Responsibility," in "And God Sow Thath Was Good ": Catholic Theology ond rhe En~iro"rnent. 185
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nations, and so it frequently ties in any discussion of environmental ethics with economic
concerns.3]
Such concern with economic justice means that the Church's social justice agenda
also extends to caring for the poor, or, from a liberation theology stance, proclaiming
solidarity with the pOOr.38 According to this theology, the environment is inseparable
from the economic and political policies which Catholic social teaching seeks to make
just. Bishop Alberto MJinera, $.1., a proponent ofliberation theology, claims that, if the
poorer populations are partially responsible for environmental degradation, it is because
they are victims of economic and political injustice:
The fast growth ofpoor populations and migrants frequently leads them to
establish their settlements in fragile environmental places or in marginal
suburban areas where inhuman standards of life deteriorate the
environmelll. They suffer from the lack of education, economic
incapacity, and from the very hann they must do the environmcnt simply
to survive. The poor also bear tbe brunt of environmentaJ damage since
the rich gobble up the rare resources. The majority of the world's peoples
are poor and they arc the prime victims-aJong with future generations-
of the ecocide tbat is ongoing. 39
Munera further says that the government, far from being an evil to be dispatched, should
be considered the "prime agent of distributive justicc" responsible for furthering the
common good and protecting the poor and the powerless. Although he laments the
11 Ibid., 187.
JlMonette links solidarity with the lleed forconversioD and discovering our authenticselves: "The solutioD
[which Lonergan, Monette, and other Christian thinkers say is provided by God] sets in motion within the
person a de"e]opmental, yet random. spontalll'OUS orienlation toward creating value, making meaning and
becoming authentic se1ves withinone's lived experience. ThisspontanenWlorientationprovidesthe
opening up ofoneself such that one can become caught up within the lives oftoose amongst oneself who
vividly and most systematically suffer the fact of eviL This being caught up in the li'"es of the oppressed.
the marginalized and the poor is the valu~ of friendship called solidarity. In solidarity, Or>e becomes
spontanoously orieutated in their whole being; intellcct, willing, sensitivity and innerself, toward loving
those: whom the "'Orld loves least." Monetlc, "Conversion and the Constitutive Function ofGrace," 82.
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reality of corrupt political systems, in Catholic social justice theory a well-organized and
just government is essential to combatting the poverty that afflicts nations worldwide.40
Recalling our discussion oftbe social nature of the human good in the previous chapter,
here 100 can be seen the importance of effective and authentic social structures in
achieving the human good.
Despite the increasing efforts of the Church and of Catholic writers to be more
attentive to issues of environmental ethics, there arc those who believe there is much left
to do, which includes, but is not rcstrieted to, clarifying and expanding upon official
Church doctrines. The Church's ambiguity is highlighted in a telling comment by Bishop
Mlmera. Liberation theologian Munera points out thai there are a lot ofpopular
misconceptions and little-known truths about the Catholic Church's moral teachings. In
this respect, he urges the Church to make a greater effort to be clear. Regardless of what
mayor may nol actually exist in Church doctrine, if Catholics and non-Catholics alike
misunderstand the Church's stance, there is little hope that differences can be reconciled.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter. Catholic environmental ethics is still
developing and in many cases is playing caleh-up rather than being cutting-edge.
Effective communication is essential to dispelling inaccurate assumptions and to
promulgating obscure but potentially useful doctrine.41 Munera also says that "[rjecent
19 Munera, "New Theology on Population, Ecology, and Overconsumption from the Catholic Perspective,"
67
"'Ibid., 69
.. An example used by Munera is thaI ofprobabilism. a system developed by the Church to combat "undue
dogmatism" which teaches that "where there is doubt1here is freedom." This is supposedly u$td in
sirnations "where good people wilh good reasons dis..gree·' as a way to sort out moral matters. For a more
detailed description, see Mlincra 70·71. The point here is that MUnera s..ys this is a hltle~kno",n bul
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popes have shown a great interest in the moral implications of the ecological situation of
the world and in consumerism. As witb probabilism, much of this is unknown to many
people.'.t2 Ifit is unknown to many, this implies that there is probably more the Church
could do to clarify and communicate its position for its followers.
In addition 10 clarifying present positions, some scholars suggest adding more to
the agenda. With sociaJ justice at the core of Catholicism, Hinze suggests that the
credibility and adequacy of Catholic social ethics would be "seriously undennined" were
it not to take into account ecologicaJ questions.4J For such thinkers the human ecology of
social relationships is inseparable from the physical ecology of the rest of the natural
world. The sociological study by Shibley and Wiggins, cited earlier and which examines
the American interfaith National Religious Partnership for the Environment (NRPE),
voices reservations about the effectiveness of current religious approaches such as
through the stewardship ethic, noting that endorsing merely stewardship "may work to
confine religious environmentalism to conventional environmental issues." The outcome
of limiting the ethic to stewardship is potentially two-sided, the authors say. On the one
hand, organized Christian religion may emerge as a strong moral authority on issues of
preservation and conservation. On the other hand, Shibley and Wiggins claim thai with
few exceptions in the fonn of more Iiber.t.l or "maverick" congregations, there is little
evidence that churches will be on the cUlting-edge of successfully combining
environmental issues with social justice. The lukewann result is that "[ro]ost churches
polentially useful Church doctrine, espedally in cases ''''here authoritarian approaches marked by an
unecumen.ical and unwarranted dogmatism cause unnecessary tensions.'"
"lbid.,71
., Hinze, "Catholic Social Teaching and Ecological Ethics," t80
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and synagogues may end up following, or resisting, rather than leading the emergent
environmental justice movement in the United States.'.44
This brief survey of Catholic attitudes towards environmental ethics highlights the
pemaps unexpected pluraJity of views within one faith tradition. The diversity would
benefit from the identification of at least a few invariant structures to ground discussion
and establish common fOlUldations. Thus it would he possible to draw from this diversity
a truly catholic or universal core upon which to build an emerging ecotheology. That
universal core could be built on the invariant structure of knowing. In its own way,
Catholicism already affirms the tnmscendcntal precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be
reasonable, be responsible, in its consideration of environmental attitudes. In its
preference for the poor, Catholicism urges attentiveness to injustice. In emphasizing
authentic development, Catholicism endorses prudence in decision-making. In its
attention 10 the common good, Catholicism seeks a reasonable balance between
individual and community interests, In affirming the stewardship model, Catholicism
insists on responsibility towards one's environment. The invariant structure already
exists according to Lonergan's cognitionallhcory. Lonergan's notion of conversion
would make this affirmation explicit. If Catholicism affirms the necessity of a religious
component in environmental ethics, Lonergan's contribution is to suggest how that
component relates to our moral and intellectual capacities. Further, religious and moral
pronouncements must be based on foundations of fact and good science; implicit in
Lonergan's generalized empirical method is his insistence on good science.
.. Shibley and Wiggins, ''The Greening of Mainline American Religion," 346.
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It is here that it would be useful to reflect on the thought of ecotheologian Thomas
Berry, who is noted for his melding of ecology and theology in his book, The Dream of
the Earth. According to Ann Marie Dalton, Berry identified three CODunon approaches to
issues of environmental ethics. Thesc he termed the confrontational approach, the
transformational approach, and the creative approach. Organizations such as the secular
Greenpeace and Earth-first movements, known for their often highly-charged activist
demonstrations, would be considered confrontational. A transformational approach
would refer to those working for change within existing political and social structures.
Thc efforts of much of mainstrcam Catholicism, such as the Vatican and various
episcopal conferences with their cmphasis on stewardship, would seem to fit this
category. II is the third category which Berry saw as the most potentially fruitful: the
creative approach looks beyond the status quo, such as the bioregionalism movement
which seeks to define boundaries not in terms of political or man-made boundaries of
fanns, cities, provinces, and countries, but rather in terms of natural borders such as
deserts, marshes, valleys, and mountains.4~ It is the component of creation and
innovation which seems to attract Berry, and Lonergan as well. From this perspective,
confrontation and transformation will only advancc one's cause so far; real progress is
rooted in creativity, in the righting of wrongs and healing through love advocated in
lAlnergan's notion of conversion.
'1 Oaltoll. 99.
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3. Conversion aDd Catholic Environmental Ethics
Conversion can only be creative and healing when it is authentic. As stated
previously in Chapters Two and Three, an essential component of authentic conversion is
consonance between knowing and doing. When action docs not reflect knowledge, it
leads to the situation Munera sees to exist today:
I believe that one of the most serious problems in the Catholic world today
is the incoherence of Catholics in their moral behavior. They may know
the helpful and inspiring doctrines... but the moral practice of most
believers is based on different structures that are the product of the
specific cultures and circumstances of the different moments of history. In
consequence, many Catholics follow in their moral practice the religion of
the market and not the religion of1esus....46
Munem's stance sees much of the world's economic practices, particularly the capitalistic
values which pervade much of the West, as being contradiclory to both the best interests
of the environment and the social justice values attributed to Catholicism.
Although there is much to debate in Munera's interpretation of economics and
politics, for the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to note his emphasis on the
difference betwecn knowing and doing. As in Lonergan's notion of conversion, it is not
enough to know, but to act, and to act authentically in accordance with what one knows.
So it is that the United States Catholic Bishops came to identify the virtue of prudence as
a guiding principle in all ethical decisions. They define prudence to be intelligence
applied to action, particularly that which allows us to discern the common good in any
given situation.47 They also acknowledge the component offrecdom in any action,
... MUlleN, "New Theology on Population, Ecology, and Overconsumption from the Catholic Perspective,"
74.
"USCCB, www.llCcbuscc.orgisdwpfinternational/gJobalclimate.hlm. Accessed &plembeT 16, 2001.
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freedom which allows us either to do the right thing or to miss the mark, that is, to sin:
"Freedom and dle capacity for moral decision making arc central to what it means to be
human.'04B If freedom and intelligence are defining factors in humanity, they are also
essential to conversion.
From our earlier discussion of conversion we know that Lonergan saw freedom to
be exercised only in the context of relationships; no one is completely autonomous.49
According to some thinkers, it is the West's emphasis on the individual which
complicates the collective decision-making process, especially 00 issues of the
environment. McFague says that "it is this sense of the individual in community that we
have lost. Our assumptions about human life, its rights and responsibilities, no longer
begin with a strong sense of solidarity toward others...!t is neither the covenant nor the
republic that is primary, but the right of the individual to financial and personal
fulfillment.,,50 While a strong sense of individuality has led to much progress in tenus of
protecting and valuing individual rights and freedoms, some fear that the scales have
tipped too far to the detriment of the common good. If religions such as Christianity
were meant to be primarily a binding together of a community, McFague says we have
lost some of that cohesion: "The view of human life sham! by religion, politics, and
economics--the sinful, but free individual-has lost what religion and politics once
provided for it: a powerful sense of community with responsibility for others."Sl
<I Ibid.
49Seecitllplerlwoofthisthcsis,2G-24,andchaplcrthrec, 14.
5ll McFaguc, 82.
"lbid.,g3
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Lonergan's notion of conversion takes into account the human predisposition for
community relationships.
Reminiscent of his insistence on self-discovery, while Lonergan speaks of
conversion with an eye to promoting collective responsibility, even this he leaves up to
the reader to judge, saying only, "[ijl remains that if collective responsibility is not yet an
established fact, it may be a possibility. Further, it may be a possibility that we can
realize. Finally, it may be a possibility that it is desirable to realize.'.52 Obviously
Lonergan hopes we conclude that collective responsibility is essential to authenticity, that
in being authentic to ourselves we will be oriented to collective responsibility, but his
point is to engage his readers in self-discovery, to suggest and orient, but not to dictate.
This self-appropriation, starting from the common ground in his cognitional theory, is
meant to lead beyond the self to the importance of community. In Lonergan's
understanding, a community "is a matter of a common field of experience, a common
mode of understanding, a common measure ofjudgment, and a common consent," not
just, as Marsh points out, a population of people living within a certain geography.B
According to Lonergan, without this sense of common meaning, people lose touch, which
leads to misunderstanding, distrust, suspicion, fear, hostility, and factions. Sol Having
different meanings often means having opposed meanings and conflicting goals. A
community needs a certain measure of cohesion to survive. Granted, extremc cohesion
may then lead to group bias, but Lonergan believes that a need for, and sense of,
II Lonergan, "Nalural Right and Historical Mind",dness," 169.
lJ Ibid.,170;Marsh,"PraxisandUltimateRealily,'·230
lo4Loncrgan,"NaturaIRighlandHistorical Mindedness,"171.
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community is part of what makes us human. 11 is aJso community which propagates
conversion on a larger scaJe:
Though conversion is intensely personal, utterly intimate, still it is not so
private as to be solitary. It can happen to many and they can fonn a
community to sustain one another in their self-lransfonnation, and to help
one another in working oul the implications, and in fulfilling the promise
of their new life. Finally, what can become communal can become
historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can spread from
one cultural milieu to another. [t can adapt to changing circumstance,
confront new situations, survive into a different age; flourish in another
period or cpoch.sS
The necessity of collective responsibility and the degree to which it exists may be open to
debate, but the fact remains of the impact our ongoing collective activity has on the
environment. Leduc points out that collectively we have not even reached the first of
Lonergan's transcendentaJ precepts, "be attentive." Environmentalists regularly bemoan
the fact that wc simply are not attentive to our vast and powerful impact on the earth.
Carmody makes a claim to the effect that we arc not intellectually converted, in his
pronouncement that "the ecological crisis comes down to simple blindness: we do not see
how the world rcally works. Especially in the industrially advanced nalions, we are
living in blatant contradiction 10 the way the world really works, ignoring the basic laws
of matter and encrgy."Sti Thus prudence, as affinned by the USCCB, must be applied to
collective decisions. Part of this intelligence applied to action means, as Leduc suggests,
thai in terms of human activity, ''we need to shift away from deciding what we ought to
do to deciding what we ought to SlOp doing."S7
"Lonergan, "Theology in its New Contex!," 13-14.
"Cannody,12
J'LedllC, 'Theology and Ecology: A Lonerganian Approach," 73.
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In the concern for the environment, it is the call for conversion which echoes from
all quadrants, regardless of doctrines or theologies. It comes from the Vatican and the
bishops conferences, from writers on liberation theology, feminist theology, creation
spirituality, the sacramental tradition, and lay scholars. It also comes from outside the
tradition where secular ecologists regularly call for fundamental and widespread change
in people's altitudes and habits. For example, the notion of conversion even appears in a
collection of essays relating geoscience to environmental issues, where contributor E-an
Zen writes of the prevailing need in amuent society to change our lifestyle in the face of
the following facts: that earth has natural limits, that ''we are fooling ourselves if we think
wc arc above these limits," that technological solutions are not a cure-all, that
"fundanlcntal human change, i.e., conversion is the only true solution" and that ''the call
for changc in the sense of conversion is the stuffofrc1igion."58 The call to conversion
applies not only to personal values and outlooks but also to economies, governments,
social policies, laws, and patterns of production, distribution and consumption.S9
Conversion, though never a sure bet due to the inherent fallibilityofhuman beings is,
according 10 Maura Ryan, "to be willing to stop taking risks with our globaJ future, and to
take risks for our global fUlure.'.60 To this effect, Lonergan's thought is applicable to
environmental ethics, in his desire 10 reveal what is unintel1igcnt and inauthentic about
human activity and to promote what is intelligent and authentic. 61 It takes conversion and
~ E-an Zen, "Stakes, Options, and Some Natural Limits 10 a Sustainable World," in The Earlh Around Us
Main/a/fling a Livable Planet, ed Jill S. Sdmeidennan(New York: \V.H. Freeman and Company, 2000),
389.
"'Ryan, 6.
60 Ibid
61 Leduc, '1l1.eologyand Eco!o8Y: A Lonerganian Approac!t,'· 69
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self-transcendence to be able to sort out the differences. Although some believe that
Lonergan overestimates our ability to discern whether we are succeeding or failing in our
attempts at self-transcendence, it is acknowledged that the attempt must be made and that
Lonergan's thought provides a viable framework. 62
The relevance of Lonergan's contribution lies in its generality. His cognitional
theol)', method of self.appropriation, and notion of conversion provide an overarching
structure for change thai is transcultural; because of the generality of his method. it
allows the generation of specific solutions for specific cultures. It puts the responsibility
to change on the individual, in that we all have the potential for self-transcendence, yet
also upon the community, in that we arc by nature social creatures whose collective
activity bears impacts nothing but a collective responsibility has the power to change.
We all know we have to change, but Lonergan clarifies the scale of that change, breaks it
down into its components, and suggests that we have more in common than some would
have us think. Now we can be aware of what those changes are, how they might occur,
and why they need to occur. His description and explanation of conversion, steeped in a
scientific mindset of verifying the hypothesis in the data, helps us better understand the
workings of conversion and its importance in matters that arc not strictly thoologica1. As
Leduc notes, "Lonergan's work is dedicated to breaking a self.perpetuating cycle of
decline. Ecological destruction is a contemporary manifestation of such a cycle.
Lonergan's work, while philosophical, is oriented to the practical, and out of this
., Sullivan, ~l<Jnergan,Con~'ersion andObje<:tivily;' 352
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pragmatic orientation arises his challenge to theology.'.63 The practical side of
Lonergan's notion of conversion arises in its demands for consistency between
knowledge/bclief and action, which is thc stuff of ethics. By emphasizing three types of
conversion Lonergan shows that it is not enough either to make religious claims without
knowledge ofhow the world works, as revealed by the rigours of the scientific method,
or to make scientific claims the norms formoraJs and ethics without a means to probe
questions of ultimate meaning as provided by a religious orientation. Just as knowledge,
values, and love are incomplete without each other in terms of authentic conversion, so
too will authentic progress in environmental ethics be a matter of collaboration between
the secular worlds of science, technology, politics, economics, law, and education, and
the religious sphere of discerning ultimate meaning.
4. Some Conclusions
Most any environmental ethics, secular or religious, calls for change in the way
we understand the world, in what we expect of it, and in how we operate in it. The need
for development is a common starting point. Lonergan's notion of conversion is a
formulation for what authentic human development is and how it may be achieved. His
6' Leduc, "Theology and Ecology: A Lonergauiao Approach." 74. Leduc's SUllemenl needs some
clarifying. While Lonergan's work is ultimately oriented loward practicality. il is often said thaI il is a
withdrawal from practi~lily for the sake of practicality. The "detached intelligence" which Lonergan
seelcs to preserve in his writing may seem 10 some to be so detached and abslract as to be irrelevant.
However, he insists thaI calering incessantly to practicality has its own pitfalls which include a sacrifice of
aulhenticity. To step hack from practicality once in a while allows one 10 recognize when it real1y is
appropriale. Lonergan calUlOI be said to be a pragmatist (which he understood as a capitulation [0
praclicality and so a way to maintain general bias), althougb his thought does have practical results. See
Insight, 255fT. Olll.'suchpraclical resull is his model for functional specialties, originally intendedasa
method for Iheological collaboration beN'een academics but which scho\ars. have oow begun to apply to
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notion of intellectual conversion is based on the three-fold structure oflrnowing
(embodied in experience, understanding,. and judgment) which he claims is invariant
among human beings. Iftllis claim is to be accepted, then his method of self-
appropriation aimed at intellectual conversion may be considered funher common
ground. Built upon this three-fold structure oflrnowing is the four-fold structure of
decision-making (embodied in experience, undcrstanding,. judgment, and deliberation).
Lonergan's notion of moral conversion, of choosing value over satisfaction where the
two conflict, relies on this fonnula for decision-making. Lonergan claims that this
formula, too, is invariant among human beings. Although the process is muddied by
biases and the general human propensity to sin, that is, to miss the mark, Lonergan
believes his transcendental method along with its norms (be altentive, be intelligent, be
reasonable, be responsible) can serve as signposts in our thinking and doing. That
Lonergan is capable of explaining intellectual and moral conversion without explicit
reference to religion should at least make him wonhy of interest and wnsideration even
to those who do not share his religious beliefs. Lonergan does draw the Christian God
into the equation with respect to religious conversion, but insists that equivalent notions
ofunrcstricted love exist outside the Christian tradition, making his philosophy accessible
to those outside the tradition as well.64
Yet there is much to be done just from within the Catholic tradition. Because of
the range of viewpoints which arise in a Catholic discussion of environmental ethics, it is
other disciplines. Functional specialization arises from his work on transcendental method and uses
Loncrgan's cognitional theory as its foundation
.. Lonergan. Melhodin Theology, 283.
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hoped that introducing Lonergan's thought may provide a nonnative basis for sorting out
differences and highlighting common ground. According to Barnes, any authentic
theological or religious reflection on the environment will support "honest and full
analyses, difficult decisions, and enduring effort."6S It will be a cooperative effort,
particularly between science and religion. Science is equipped to probe into the effect
and extent of environmental degradation, while religion is equipped to address the
meaning behind it.66 Although politics and economics have an important stake in
environmental issues, the scope of this thesis is simply to suggest that religion also has a
stake and a relevant contribution. Christiansen and Grazer add that:
Religious communities are particularly well suited to engage tbe issue of
the environment. They have theological and teaChing resources,
geographically and culturally diverse communities, and most importantly,
the moral authority needed to address major issues by virtue of their very
mission. Creating a sense of the sacred is fundamental to an ethic of
respect and care for God's creation, and it is the distinctive mission of the
religious community to develop such an ethic.67
This may be said especially of Catholicism, which spans countries, crosses cultures,
includes significant populations, and possesses a lengthy history.6s According to
Christiansen and Grazer, a specifically Catholic approach will insist that environmental
issues rest on a theological foundation, where enviromncntal concerns will be explored in
tenns ofScripture, worship, spirituality, and moral norms.69 Catholicism is further
notable in its social ethics which highlights an ethics of restraint and responsibility,
~Bames, 7
60l Christiansen and Graur, 2.
•1 Ibid., S.
"'french, uConlestingEnergies,"J27.
~ChrisliansenandGtazer,6
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stewardship, and the common good.7{I As far as Catholicism is concerned, it may be a
latecomer to the dialogue, especially considering its fonnidab1e presence in other moral
matters throughout history, but the "belter-late-Ihan-never" adage stands. Catholic
environmental ethics slands 10 learn a lot from the progress already made by other
religious and secular environmental efforts. It also has much to contribute based on the
principles and doctrines already outlined in this thesis. Finally, although in life LQnergan
did not express explicit interest in environmental issues, the legacy of thought he leaves
in his cognitional theory, method of self-appropriation, and notions of self-transcendence
and conversion, offers much potential for discussion both in the religious and secular
realms of environmental ethics.
LQnergan's cognitional theory serves as the foundation for his life's work and
thought. It is at the heart of his notion of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion,
and the call for change embraced in conversion is a crux in any discussion of
environmental ethics. Perhaps if we dwell a little more on acquiring mastery in our own
house, that is, on discovering our own self-transccndcnce proper 10 the human process of
coming to knOW/I then we will have a greater chance of mastering the "house
knowledge" proper to Ihe spirit of ecology. Perhaps il is the combination of proper
knowing and propcr doing that will ground the realization that through ronversion we
may transfonn this "house knowledge" into the proper love of home.
"" Ryan, 11; See also Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Theological Resources for Earth-Healing: Covenant and
Sacramcnt."60.
"umcrgan,MelhodinTheology,239
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